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### 1NC – Sovereignty K

#### Anarchic thought condemns any appeal to order and self-determination

George **SHULMAN** Political Theory @ Gallatin School NYU **’20** “Fred Moten’s Refusals and Consents: The Politics of Fugitivity” *Contemporary Political Theory* p. Published First Online

Moten and Harney instantiate the “what,” or constitutive practices of the undercommons, by juxtaposing “fugitive planning” and “black study” to “politics” and “critique.” Planning and study emerge from sociality as “the blur itself . . . a phenomenon of indistinctness” that confounds self and other (BB, 243). Sociality is not “friendly association with others” as discretely bounded individuals, but “friendly association . . . in the exhaustion of relational individuality”; it is a “radically transformative, self-endangering, selfun- gendering” entanglement that reproduces life by endlessly ramifying difference (BB, 283, 275). But planning and study are practices giving “improvisational” meaning and “informal” order to this flux in ways that engender open-ended process rather than self-enclosing stipulation.

Partly that is because “planners are part of the plan,” and planning is the creation of “the means of social reproduction”—including themselves—“by a common experiment launched from any kitchen, back porch, basement hall, park bench, improvised party. This ongoing experiment with the informal, carried out by and on the means of social reproduction, is what we mean by planning” (UC, 74). Enacting “self-sufficiency at the social level” by practicing indebtedness, planning “reproduces not just what it needs, life, but what it wants, life in difference, in the play of general antagonism” (UC, 76). Planning connotes world-building in tacit and ordinary, not epic or evental, ways, as people improvise relations of “entanglement and virtuosity” in their “virtuous, communal, maternal attention to detail” (BB, 273). Jane Jacobs identified “urban planning” with the state’s patriarchal power, whereas Moten and Harney thus construe fugitive planning as the explicitly maternal self-organizing that she and they identify with the informal order of street and neighborhood life. What Moten later calls “our under-political block party” honors not “our father’s but our mother’s civil rights movement in its radical dispersal, ongoing, decentralized largesse . . . hand-to-hand rituals” and “constant practice of the haptical poetics of entanglement” (BB, 277).26

What they call “politics” posits the deficiency of ordinary people and “whispers of our need for institutions,” for “all politics is correctional” and “all institutions are political” (UC, 20). Planning is invaded by politics as rule or sovereign power, but it is undone from within if “democratic” forms of governance turn subalterns from their “habitual jam” to institutions promising to represent or improve them. For emancipation from minority or tutelage (in Kant’s idiom of critique) or from domination (in Hegelian, democratic, or Fanonian idioms of politics) posit deficiency to promise self-determination in intellectual and political senses. Correction or improvement are enacted “democratically” if subalterns are interpellated into purportedly valid argument, ostensibly mature self-legislation, true representation in political bodies, or properly political speech and action, each reproducing antiblackness in its terms of legitimation. On the one hand, to posit a coherent, articulate, self-possessed (collective) subject, the “brilliant ruse of self-determination” must make life “wrong” in its resistant opacity, unspeakability, wayward aliveness—or blackness (SL, 212). On the other hand, “self-management not from above but from below”—ostensibly democratic governance—is achieved by getting us to ask “what do we not have that we need?” But defining deficiency and addressing the state “privatizes reproduction” and forecloses asking, “what do we already have and do that we must ‘militantly preserve?’” (UC, 55). Moreover, the “distinctness” of a political body or collective subject—posited in the very act of address—is “the all-but-unchecked disaster of generativity’s arrest”—arrest as interdiction, as if to stop motion and time and fix being’s “essential fugitivity” (BB, 26).

The struggle between “those who dwell in policy and fix things and those who dwell in planning and must be fixed,” Moten and Harney argue, is “played out not only in the range of correctional facilities Foucault analyzed— asylums, prisons, hospitals—but also corporations, universities, and NGO’s” (UC, 78). The indistinction and generativity of “earthly and inseparable assembly” precedes and surrounds every institution, setting terms of antagonism and struggle. “The fort really . . . is besieged by what still surrounds it, the common beyond and beneath—before and after—enclosure” (UC, 17). Modern institutions are thus reactive in character—counter-insurgencies to improve what is lacking or correct what is dangerous in the ongoing sociality they occupy—but also appropriate and formalize. “Politics would make us better”—by pathologizing “those who won’t change”—but because “nothing is wrong with us . . . we are the general antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to politicize us.” Indeed, “we surround democracy’s false image to unsettle it. Every time it tries to enclose us in a decision, we’re undecided. Every time it tries to represent our will, we’re unwilling. We cannot represent ourselves. We can’t be represented” (UC, 19–20).27

These claims about “politics” and “democracy” reflect two kinds of antagonism: one contrasts “those who run things”—elites and their “logistics,” including democratic rule as settler colonialism and white supremacy—and “things that run,” those coerced and conscripted into modernity, said to need fixing, improvement, accreditation. The second antagonism contrasts informal (improvised, local) practices of mutual aid and reflection, and the formalization of power/knowledge instantiated in schools, political parties, democratic states. If the first antagonism echoes Niccolo Machiavelli’s distinction between the few who would dominate and the many who would not be oppressed, the second links refusal to be governed to customary practices of mutual aid and vernacular modes of reflection and expression. In both regards, Moten and Harney depict not only the sociality of those marked black but “the actual existence of . . . non-statist sociality” across time, a claim (inspired by the work of Cedric Robinson) that affiliates European struggles against enclosure from diggers to autonomists, with global struggles against settler colonialism and racial capitalism (SL, 26).

Across Moten’s work, therefore, vitality and freedom are linked only to the informal, which is imagined not as chaos or absence of form but rather as the groundless social ground of tacit sense-making and practical collaboration, so that “informal form” is like Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ordinary or Jane Jacobs’s street life. Depicting a structural antagonism between institutionalized (white) forms and informal (black) sociality, he proposes a generative tension between fugitive energy and form within and by the improvisational informality exemplified in planning, jazz, and grammar. Ordinary collaboration embodies “power to” or kratia, a “capacity to generate generative form,” not as a rule or arche “to which generativity would then submit itself”— “generativity’s arrest”—but as a “proliferative generative form” that enables “common growth in difference” (UM, 137). Sociality thus bears a “jurisgenerative” capacity to create internally differentiating forms of nomos—and without state-enforced rule(s) or stipulated (constitutional) “law” to settle conflicts. Because informality inherently engenders form, any effort to convert planning or study to formalized practices (of politics or critique) inflicts both unalloyed and unnecessary loss. There is harm only in politics, not in forgoing it.28

At the outset of The Undercommons, Moten and Harney thus declare:

Our task is the self-defense of the surround in the face of . . . dispossession through the settler’s armed incursion. While acquisitive violence occasions this self-defense . . . recourse to self-possession in the face of dispossession (recourse, in other words to politics) represents the real danger. Politics is an ongoing attack on the common -the general and generative antagonism- from within the surround. (UC, 17)

Though the undercommons is depicted as immune to interpellation, “the real danger” is less settler violence imposing enclosure and more “self-defense” against dispossession by recourse to politics as a modality of self-possession. Though politics and critique are typically cast as crucial to the self-defense of subaltern life, they are Trojan horses that devalue and disarm it from within. “Critique lets us know that politics (as settler power) is radioactive,” but in fact “politics is the radiation of critique,” and we are harmed by “exposure to the lethal effects of its anti-social energy” (UC, 19).29

In The Undercommons, politics is the “radiation” of critique because critique identifies deficiency to promote “self-possession” in “political” forms of self-determination, but politics and critique are both lethal because their goal is inherently “correctional” and their practices are both parasitic on and appropriative of tacit life. In Moten’s trilogy, politics is also depicted as enforcing the metaphysics of the subject, and thereby antiblackness, and both are enshrined as “sovereignty” is democratized in personal and political terms—as possessive individualism, as political self-determination, as proper membership in a bounded “political body” or state.

This argument enables Moten and Harney to declare that the Black Panthers “theorized revolution without politics”—that is, “with neither a subject nor a principle of decision”—by practicing “ongoing planning” and “contrapuntal study of and in the commonwealth, poverty, and blackness of the surround” (UC, 18). This claim splits wholly “toxic” politics from idealized sociality, as if the Panthers did not organize a party, define authority, exercise organizational power, undertake public engagements with political institutions and white society, and claim popular sovereignty as a collective black subject. Moten and Harney honor Panther agonism toward white institutions when they say “we don’t want to be correct, and we won’t be corrected. Politics proposes to make us better, but we were good already,” yet they do not credit how Panthers, to overcome slavery’s damaging legacy, endorsed a self-correction they folded within profound affirmation of black value (UC, 20). By shifting the revolutionary from politics to sociality, by depicting Panthers engaged only in planning as social reproduction but not in politics, their agonistic refusal to be governed appears only against “politics,” not as a politics or a tension within politics. What shall we make of this?

The Undercommons offers “planning” and “study” as “toys” and “props to play with” (UC, 105), making the text a transitional space in which radical democrats and critical theorists can “study” their own practice of politics and theory. The premise of this play is not so much argued as assumed; every institution in modern liberal civil society enacts a foundational racial antagonism in their norms and material practices. This plausible premise generates a logic whereby self-defense by public engagement or organized power seems not even risky but inherently self-defeating, and any effort to argue against this inference bespeaks both white privilege and cruel optimism. I would credit the premise but render the inferences contestable and situational— politically contingent rather than logically entailed.30

On the one hand, the logic posits a frontier of antagonism, which requires “self-defense” of sociality as a revolutionary treasure. Moten’s “assumption [is] that politics, insofar as it is predicated upon the exclusion and regulation of difference, will have always been the scene of our degradation and never the scene of our redemption, redress, or repair” (BB, 256). The danger in “politics” is not only violent occupation by sovereign rule exercised as exclusion and regulation, nor only “democratizing” rule in the form of achieving subject status by recognition and representation. Politicization is itself also a problem. Partly, claims about justice involve harm and remedy in ways that presume the grammar of the subject and the cruel optimism of recognition that Moten refuses on behalf of black vitality. Mobilizing life as protest also devalues aliveness as if mere life, acquiescent, inarticulate, deficient if not abject—unless translated into explicit, intelligible claim-making. Moten thus asks, “can marginality be de-politicized?”—because its integrity and generativity are jeopardized by interpellation into purportedly political speech and public forms of action.

By saying “insofar as politics is predicated on rule,” however, does he open a space for politics predicated otherwise? After all, fugitive sociality is world-building in ways he also calls public and puts in grammatical proximity to the political: “As life which has been stolen steals away,” so a “kind of impossible publicness emerges through radical exclusion from the political,” and by refusing the status of subject and citizen that has been refused. (SL, xii). How he plays on but refuses the meanings of “political” is demonstrated by an amazing section in Stolen Life, “Air Shaft, Rent Party,” which begins, “I’m here to announce the formation of a new political party” that “is new because it’s not political” (SL, 189–90).

On the one hand, it is characterized by fugitive ambivalence:

Even though the party is, and takes place in, and takes place as a kind of refuge, refuge still indicates that those who take it are refugees and people tend not to want to have to live like that. It’s all messed up, though, because tremendous amounts of love are circulated in refuge so you can’t leave ‘cause your heart is there. But insofar as you’re always dreaming about leaving, which is to say that insofar as you’re always leaving, you can’t stay cause you been somewhere else. Living in two times and places at once, and between loving and leaving the “impossible publicness” of a refuge, this “party” dreams of ending fugitive status while celebrating the ethos it generates.31

On the other hand, therefore:

This new party . . . could be called the house party, but don’t let that mislead you into thinking that house implies ownership: this house party is of and for the dispossessed, the ones who disavow possession, the ones who, in having been possessed of the spirit of dispossession, disrupt themselves. They’re preoccupied with disowning, with unowning. . . . This is the party of the ones who are not self-possessed. . . . So you see what I mean when I say that this new political party is not a political party . . . [but] an extra-political . . . beforeandafterparty.

This before and after, pre- and post-, ante- and anti-, un- and extra-political “party,” in its disowning and unowning ethos, embodies the remainder left as waste by the properly political, the excess beyond its bounds. It is also a “new political party to end all political parties” because it is a “rent party” to sustain a house as refuge, partying to reproduce not only mere life but “the good life in difference.” Partly, that is “feeling each other in the place where we feel—because we bear—each other as differences . . . where the fleshly thing you might have wanted to call a body [is] moving in and with and through each other.” Partly, life in difference “is given in its most essential form” as “that ongoing giving of form we call the informal.” This “emergence of form in and from the informal is the city we’re always making . . . the city of plans . . . of passages . . . of stateless practice” (SL, 189–90).

If publicness is not rule “predicated on the exclusion and regulation of difference,” could it represent another kind of politics? Moten denies this. Still, he calls fugitive sociality “ante-political,” not only “anti-political,” and he sees “the more and less than political experience” of sociality as both “constitutive and disruptive of every political instance.” He even says “this condition that is before and against politics might become something akin to what good people have desired under the rubric of politics.” Indeed, “this terrible beauty [of fugitive sociality] works its wounded kinship to politics” (UM, 79). Kinship because politics is “derivative” of social capacities of assembly and imagination, but wounded because “any political body must exclude and disavow” what he calls “a necessarily social impropriety” (UM, 101). At issue is less “what constitutes political experience, but what antepolitical forces remain in the wake of political reduction and regulation” (UM, 107).

Moments of blur gesture toward a possibility that the fugitivity (or “antepolitical forces”) that Moten protects against “politics” (as reduction and regulation by rule) might be mobilized in or as a radically democratic politics, committed to practice rule or exercise power otherwise. After all, historical instances of grand marronage, or Native American and Zapatista politics now, also draw antistate frontiers to protect the ante-state integrity of self-organization on nonstatist terms, to protect (the blackness of) the margins by not reproducing (the whiteness of) the center. In these examples, grievous losses and grave dangers are lodged in self-possessive (propertied) individualism, organized (alienated) representation, and state-centric (political) institutions. What we might call the creative paranoia of fugitives thus enables turning away and self-defense on behalf of independent and reparative sociality. But Moten’s idealization of sociality appears in his differences from these examples.32

To begin with, though they affirm dispossession ethically, they contest it politically, and not only around land and resources. Native tribes, maroons, or Zapatista activists do not denounce sovereignty as such but instead reanimate inherited ideas to organize self-defense, rework democratic governance, and imagine community as a distinct political body. Likewise, refusing transcendental (liberal or sovereign) forms of “the subject” has not meant refusing any idea of bounded subjects in relation; instead, we see bounded (“relational”) selfhood lived differently when a community’s shared practices acknowledge its Dionysian undoing. Moreover, even if sociality is ontologically given as a “generative antagonism,” and embraced as our groundless ground, it is always-already, inescapably pervaded by antagonisms between those who run things and things that run. Moten repeatedly evokes the maternal to signal that the undercommon is suffused by mutual care and reproductive labors, but he wholly ignores divisions entailed by inequalities of class, gender, or homophobia. Or rather, instead of directly addressing class and gender inequality in the black world, he invokes the reality of a common condition that wealth and status cannot escape, and on that basis makes an ethical turn to reassert the commonality of an inherited maternal ethos that inequalities increasingly jeopardize. An egalitarian “modality” of sociality, therefore, is not ontologically guaranteed or paradoxically sustained by the color line; equality is an achievement that requires organized struggle of some against others, not only against formal white institutions imposing enclosure and precarity from without, but also against “informal forms” of domination or status. In its structural and intramural aspects, inequality generates and demands both inward and outward-facing forms of politics.33

For sure, efforts to engage the state and formally organized power can and do endanger the vitality of the informal practices Moten and Harney call planning, but injustice in the ordinary and the limitations of the local often compel such risks. As the Panthers or BLM activists demonstrate, tacit knowledge and vernacular idioms are recurrently translated into explicit political questions about power and justice, addressed both to and beyond the undercommon. Recurrently, subalterns thus organize representation and power in formalized (not only decentralized) ways and at wider scales, and designate a collective subject through political parties and bodies, even as idioms of “planning” inform how they exercise power and imagine community. Of course Moten knows this history, but his engagement with Arendt suggests why he insists that any effort to politicize (black) sociality is inherently self-defeating.

#### They represent the world in terms of structuring binaries: bricolage/governance, sovereignty/vitality, institutions/insurgency. We should reject this dichotomous frame.

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Rather than correct his reading of Arendt, note instead how both theorists narrate a history producing impasse and compose romances of a revolutionary treasure each protects from devaluation and danger. Despite moments of blur in their texts, their categorical self-definitions split off natality from a threatening other, albeit lodged in inverted images of sociality and politics. Her reversal foregrounds and redeems natality-as-politics from capture by the social; his reduction of the political—to sovereignty as metaphysics, state power, and antiblackness—redeems fugitive black sociality from capture by politics. Yet as she argues—and manifests—theorists who “reverse” a polarity remain trapped in its terms; arguably, he risks capture by the metaphysics he would undo. The alternative to the canonical tradition, I would say, is refusing an Aristotelian or Kantian split between the political, and its abject (immature, wild, social, abject) otherness. In crucial ways Moten does just that, by finding natality, publicness, and performative pleasure—a “regenerative grammar” of “informal form”—in blackened sociality. But for him, the autonomy and integrity of this grammar, is targeted by correction and endangered by appropriation. Defending it requires refusing politicization,any translation into the “necrophilic” grammar of “sovereignty,” as connoting organized (even democratized) rule, politics by representation, and a subject centered (possessive, rights-bearing) individualism. At stake in his reversal is warding off this demonic specter, which haunts and harms fugitive life in the undercommon. What Moten calls sovereignty thus names truly destructive forces and fictions but also seems like a charged, disavowaed and projected object or specter. For his vision of jurisgenerativity, defined only as the fecundity of informal (noncoercive and multiplicitous) meaning-making, is sustained by disavowing the signifiers of power, exemplified by (participation in) a form of rule, by formal rules, by institutional organization, by stipulations of a collective subject, or by membership in an explicitly bounded political body.

In turn, radical democrats may refuse his reduction of politics to sovereignty, but if we then identify the properly political as nonsovereign action, as nonrule or (fugitive) refusal to be governed, we remain captive to this demonic picture of power and its idealized other. By affirming only the “power to” of solidarity and action in concert, we risk disavowing power “over,” as participation in rule, as explicit rule-making, and as “ruling out” antidemocratic interests and practices. Do we imagine that generativity thrives only by refusing rule**,** and not also through forms of structure and even imposition, as parents and teachers know? As Prospero, a personification of both sovereignty and theory, finally acknowledged Caliban as the “dark thing” he must “own as mine,” the trope of fugitivity entails a disavowed remainder, the problem of power and rule, which needs to be acknowledged. For freedom requires not only flight from rule, but flight into it, as a problem that no one can escape, but that a democratic politics explicitly acknowledges and undertakes to rework by participatory practices of contest.40

Using Moten’s own idiom, I would ask: “What if” we do not dichotomize the informal assembly and praxis of fugitive sociality, and politics-as-rule predicated on exclusion and regulation of difference? “What if” a democratic theory must blur the social and political but also acknowledge inescapable, fraught, yet potentially fruitful tensions—between tacit grammar and explicit acts of translation, between informal form and organized forms of power, between fugitive aliveness as resistance to rule, and organizing democratic power to make claims on how the world is ruled? “What if” we refuse (not reverse) the abstract polarity between subjection to sovereign rule as such, or statelessness as refusal to be governed as such, and “come down to earth” as Marx put it? We then find politicality not in rule or nonrule, as such, but in the judgments and actions by which subalterns address who makes decisions (and how) about which practices, values, and inequalities are being ruled out, or which encouraged, in the communities they are building by socio-poetic insurgency? In difficult historical contexts they rework and mediate tacit grammars, customary practices, and explicit forms of organized power as they reconstitute democratic forms of rule-making.41

These what-ifs suggest a conversation between Moten and Sheldon Wolin. The parallels are striking. Wolin depicts a “system” so “immovable and interconnected as to be unreformable as a totality”; he calls “pessimism” a “reasoned insight” and “suppressed revolutionary impulse”; and he endorses a “rejectionism” whereby citizens “withdraw and direct their energies and civic commitment to finding new life forms.” Moreover, “instead of imitating most political theories,” which adopt “the state as the primary structure, and adapt the activity of citizens” to it, Wolin refuses “the state paradigm” and the “liberal- legal corruption of the citizen.” He affirms how “common life resides in cooperation and reciprocity that human beings develop to survive, meet their needs, and explore their capacities and the remarkable world into which they have been cast.” He thus rejects Arendt’s splitting of political and social, and her valorization of the “who,” and in Moten’s terms he instead values how “entanglement and virtuosity” are negotiated in the “common life” of the ordinary. Both theorists thus defend “preservation” of customary ways of “taking care of beings and things,” as Wolin says, against neoliberal correction, progressive promises of incorporation, and radical romances of emancipation.42

Moten’s two antagonisms—between the few who run things and things that run, and between informal form and formalization—echo Wolin’s critique of bureaucracy, of “institutionalized systems of power,” and of “constitutional democracy”; and Moten’s refusals resonate with Wolin’s late claim that democracy names not a form of government but “fugitive” moments of insurgency. And though Wolin seems to mean “fugitive” only in its temporal sense of transient or fleeting, he also depicts democracy as interdicted by idioms of governance, contained by constitutions and organized power, and pathologized by norms stipulating the legal and proper. Like blackness— though Wolin never makes this association—his democracy is (called) criminal, transgressive, and chaotic; it is feared, hunted, and enclosed, though also “wanted,” desired, and used for legitimation. Both theorists embrace such epithets while showing how insurgency bespeaks “jurisgenerative” energies, engendered by commonality and memory, that precede and surround formal (state-centric) politics. Their fugitive protagonists—an undercommons or popular insurgency—claim a spatial and symbolic distance from a deranged modern regime, and in Wolin’s words “replace the old citizenship” by “a fuller and wider notion of being, whose politicalness will be expressed not in one or two activities—voting or protesting—but in many.” Of course, this very “politicalness” is one mark of deep differences.43

Though Wolin’s awareness of racial inequality appears in repeated associations of democratic moments and social movements with black insurgency, he does not grasp how “commonality” names not (only) a resource against enclosure but the historical production of whiteness and settler colonialism. He laments the gap between formal citizenship and genuine participation, which effectively disempowers legally enfranchised citizens, but never construes citizenship as a racial status, “standing” as white, constituted by a racial state of exception. His hard-pressed “citizens” draw on tacit (local, rooted) customs, but he does not credit how their “commonality” reproduces popular power by racial terror. Moten thus brings to this idiom of commonality and democracy, as to Arendt’s “common sense” and “world,” a justified presumption that such predicates of the political mean antiblackness. But acknowledging this truth is also the premise of thinking abolition and radical democracy together.44

For if Wolin’s commonality risks racial innocence, his idea of the political remains essential because it highlights the foreclosures in Moten’s sociality. First, Wolin depicts both tacit commonality and explicit insurgency as contingent and, in that sense, as political. Whereas Moten depicts sociality underwritten by ontology, and reproduced as antiblackness generates “common habitation and flight,” Wolin sees every (under)common undone by political economy and individualism, not only by incorporation into formal politics. Whereas Moten imagines the “absolute sufficiency” of sociality informally reproduced, Wolin argues that commonality itself is (re)generated and remade only by practices that, though “emerging out of” sociality, politicize— acknowledge, (re)articulate, or (re)organize—tacit customs and vernacular memories. Tacit commonalty is at once discovered, remade and regenerated only people make explicit claims in “public declarations,” or visibly exercise “collective power” to “promote or protect the well-being” of a “collectivity,” including an undercommon.45

Second, Wolin also links and distinguishes sociality and politicality by depicting the experience and practice of sharing and exercising power. For Wolin, local or customary “institutions and practices are sustained” only by our “capacity to share in power, to cooperate in it.” “Power to,” generated and shared by the ongoing practices of assembly and cooperation that Moten calls planning, is thus the basis of all other goods. But, as “distilled” from the “relations and circles we move within”—call this Moten’s sociality—this power, at once “symbolic, material, and psychological,” “enables political beings to act together.” As the political dimension of sociality, “power” can be extracted by states or undermined by individualism, and thus alienated, a loss that devitalizes the solidarity—and thereby the generative capacity—of sociality. The recurring “loss of the political,” as capacities to articulate the tacit and organize power, reveals the nature of the political as a distinctive “mode of experience,” for “we are always losing it and having to recover it.” But “renewal” is always possible, partly “as human beings rediscover the common being of human beings,” partly by “creating new patterns of commonality” across differences, and partly by (re)making “modes of action” by which to “concert their powers.” Though grounded in sociality, Wolin’s political thus opens an interval between the tacit and the explicit, in which experience is metabolized and (re)articulated. In this interval people question the organization of power and rules of justice, and they answer as they “reinvent forms and practices” that express “a democratic conception of collective life.”46

For Moten, of course, “democratic” and collective” signal the alienated rule that abstracts from lived sociality to “designate” a political to represent us, whereas black fugitives refuse to be governed or represented by others but also to translate themselves into legible political terms. In contrast, Wolin offers a potentially fruitful, not only correctional or appropriative—we might say agonistic—relation between the tacit and the explicit. In fact, practices of “fugitive democracy” recurrently emerge in and from black sociality, as the practices of Black Lives Matter activism most recently demonstrate. For sure, practices of concealment and evasion, which defend black fugitivity from surveillance, regulatory correction, and violence, and practices of public action that engage whites and the state, are contradictory in crucial ways, as Juliet Hooker has argued. But as Rom Coles and Lia Haro argue, frontline communities on the underground railroad also engaged repeatedly in “flagrantly public” action in concert, both in literal self-defense of black autonomy in its fugitive illegality, and to contest the rule(s) of police, the law, and the state; as recent protests suggest, they viewed formal political institutions both as “integral to white supremacy so far,” but also “as potential instruments toward emancipatory ends.”47

If Hooker sees temporal shifts between moments of “black fugitivity” and moments of “fugitive democracy” in the thought and practice of Frederick Douglass, Coles/Haro depict an ongoing “oscillation” between inward-facing and outward-turning practices. Likewise, Neil Roberts defends grand marronage for seeking a “sustainable rather than fleeting form of flight” by forging autonomous spaces, and yet, because “freedom in our world lies not in permanent evasion of Leviathan” but in “taming” it, he proposes an idea of “sociogenic marronage” to reconstruct “an order in need of systemic repair**.”** Not coincidentally, Wolin’s fugitive democracy, though “rejectionist” and antistatist in its major chords, includes a social democratic minor key, which notes the limits of localism and the necessity of seeking and using state power to address structural inequality and collective fate.48

Complex and generative tensions are lost, then, as Moten recovers the freedom schools organized by Fannie Lou Hamer but not her organizing for the right to vote, to exercise popular sovereignty locally, especially around police and schools, but also to create a “Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party” that entered national politics. Hamer (like the Black Panthers and Black Lives Matter) models how black radicalism has lived in an interval between the tacit grammar and ongoing “planning” of black fugitivity—as loopholes of retreat practiced and concealed in plain sight—and flagrant publicity as fugitive democracy. Whereas for Moten, the historical failure or defeat of outward-facing public action proves the futility of fugitive democracy, I would ask: “what if” we follow his own fugitive view that any being or act is both incomplete and excessive, to infer that specific historical experiments are not definitive failures, but unfinished in meaning, examples we could retrieve and refashion now? If keeping open such possibility risks cruel optimism, foreclosing it reifies the impasse he generatively transvalues in so many other ways.

#### Tracing the world-making power of self-determination builds solidarity in the face of environmental injustice, global hierarchy, and exploitation.

Ali **MEGHJI** Lecturer @ Cambridge **’20** “What can the sociology of race learn from the histories of anti-colonialism?” *Ethnicities* Online First p. SAGE p. 7-13

Getachew’s (2019: 2) book holds that while decolonization is seen as a moment of ‘nation-building [. . .] and the formation of nation-states’, instead, we ought to see anticolonial nationalism itself as an exercise in ‘worldmaking’. In other words, Getachew recasts anticolonial nationalism itself as a transnational process, seeking an equitable remaking of the world to overcome the injustices of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Getachew’s (2019: 5) book thus signals a gestalt shift in the way that she envisages anticolonial nationalism not as ‘marking the collapse of internationalism and the closure of alternative conceptions of a world after empire’, but instead as a direct, transnational confrontation to ‘the legacies of imperial hierarchy with a demand for the radical reconstitution of the international order’.

Through focusing explicitly on Nnamdi Azikiwe, W.E.B. Du Bois, Michael Manley, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, George Padmore, and Eric Williams, Getachew focuses on three forms of anticolonial worldmaking. Firstly, Getachew explores the anticolonial demand for the right to selfdetermination. Central to Getachew’s (2019: 75) argument is that anticolonial nationalists did not simply ‘take up’ the West’s discourse of self-determination and use it to secure their own independence, but – similarly to how Gopal (2019) looks at anticolonial iterations of liberty, freedom, and justice – through an ‘anticolonial appropriation’ such nationalists radically reconceptualised the meaning of self-determination. Thus, as it was first articulated by the League of Nations, self-determination involved ‘the consent of the governed and consultation with subject people’; however, this definition still allowed for colonialism given that ‘racially backwards people’ were said to not yet be capable of self-governance (Getachew, 2019: 42). Years after the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945 again evoked ‘human rights and equality of nations [. . .] as founding principles of a new world order’ despite the continuity of colonial rule (Getachew, 2019: 71). By contrast, anticolonial radicals – through forming organisations and conferences such as the League against Imperialism, and the Pan-African Congresses – directly highlighted the hypocrisy of the Westernized definition of self-determination. For instance, Nkrumah and Padmore organised the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, 1945, where the epistemic roots were planted for self-determination to be reconceptualised as a universalist issue of human rights. Through showing how colonialism itself was a violation of human rights, the work of anticolonial nationalists radically shifted the discourse of selfdetermination such that by 1960, when Nkrumah spoke to the UN as the president of Ghana, he was able to use the principle of self-determination to show how colonialism was directly against the UN’s principles, thus leading to the Article 1514 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries.

Secondly, Getachew looks at anticolonial nationalist worldmaking through focusing on the formation of regional federations. As Getachew (2019: 113) shows, to such anticolonial nationalists, sovereignty granted through the right to self-determination was ‘meaningless in the context of international hierarchy and economic dependence’. This relates to Nkrumah’s critique of neo-imperialism, described as ‘the disjuncture between formal independence and de facto dependence’ (Getachew, 2019: 108), whereby nation states have ‘nominal freedom’ yet remain economically dependent on the Global North and thus vulnerable to political domination through financial control. In response to this neo-imperialism, radicals like Nkrumah and Eric Williams saw federations – such as the Union of African States or the West Indian Federation – as providing the potential for economic trade and development that did not require foreign intervention and reliance on the Global North. This is why, for instance, upon Ghana becoming a republic in 1960, Nkrumah’s nationalism also involved successfully advocating for a clause in the constitution that conferred on the parliament ‘the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana’ once a Union of African States was formed (Getachew, 2019: 107): national independence was thus connected to an embracing of anticolonial internationalism.

Connected to such building of federations, which ultimately failed, Getachew explores the final form of anticolonial nationalist worldmaking: the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Getachew thus shows how ‘second wave’ anticolonial nationalists, such as Michael Manley and Julius Nyerere, developed Nkrumah’s critique of neo-imperialism to show how formerly colonized nations were still vulnerable and exploited in an unequal global political economy – if not by other nations, then by private corporations. This meant that not only were the newly independent nations unequally integrated into the world economic system, but that their efforts of state building were also much more susceptible to the fluctuations of the international markets and private, corporate interests. Thus emerged the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The Declaration for the Establishment of an NIEO, put to the UN in 1974, challenged the way that the UN’s General Assembly – where each member has one vote – has the power to issue legally binding international economic policy. Anticolonial nationalists, such as Nyerere, pointed out that such formal, legislative equality that was granted to formerly colonized nations was not translated into a substantive equality – as Getachew (2019: 93) summaries: ‘to say that Jamaica or Tanzania and the United States were equal members of the international order obfuscated the outsized economic dominance that the United States exercised and could deploy to compel dependent states’. Thus, Nyerere argued that an NIEO was needed such that newly independent states could have the freedom to pursue their own economic programmes, including the ability to nationalize industries under private control. To such nationalists, this NIEO was in fact a necessary prerequisite to achieve the UN’s founding principle for international order: that of sovereign equality. In other words, anticolonial radicals used the principle of national sovereignty, and economic control over one’s own nation, again as a process through which we could achieve an anti-imperial world order.

At the heart of Getachew’s (2019: 2) book, therefore, is the principle that ‘decolonization was a project of reordering the world that sought to create a domination free and egalitarian international order’. Anticolonial nationalism, read through this lens, despite evoking principles of self-determination and national sovereignty, was always concerned with the grander transnational project of remaking the world in an equitable fashion.

Stretching the sociology of race across time and space

While my review of these three books’ arguments is fairly brief, I hope it is already apparent that despite making discrete arguments and contributions, they each share some fundamental similarities. Throughout the books, we see recurrent figures mentioned – from Du Bois, Padmore and Nkrumah, through to Gandhi, Churchill, and Woodrow Wilson – as well as analysis of key institutions and conferences – from the Gadar Party, based on the West Coast of the United States campaigning for Indian anti-colonialism, through to the League against Imperialism and the Pan-African Congresses. I want to now develop this review by focusing on three particular ways that these three books’ transnational and historical scopes push forward the sociology of race.

Racism at home, imperialism abroad

Firstly, each of these three books makes the point that there is an inherent connection between racism ‘at home’ in the West, with Western practices of colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism ‘abroad’. Desai’s (2020) discussion, for instance, interrogates how Du Bois saw racialised capitalism as the binding factor between the United States’ exploitation of Black Americans with the British empire’s colonial apparatus, and how ‘whiteness’ offered a symbolic space of purity – a material and psychological wage – that impeded the white workers across the West to endorse an anti-imperialism. In his critique of racial capitalism, therefore, Du Bois argues that ‘the English working classes are exploiting India [. . .] and the working classes of America are subjugating Santo Domingo and Haiti [. . .] He is a co-worker in the miserable modern subjugation of over half the world’ (quoted in Desai 2020: 144). Similarly, Gopal (2019: 284) questions: ‘How could the problem of race in the context of global imperialism be addressed in its specificity and as it intersected with the question of class and the exploitation of labour?’ In exploring this question through the lens of dissent against the British empire, Gopal (2019: 441) presents the work of anticolonial Marxists – such as C. L.R James, Padmore, and Eric Williams – each of whom stressed that ‘if empire was to be left behind, then the buccaneering capitalism that it had propagated would also need to be replaced with a more radically egalitarian system’. In advocating for a new ‘radically egalitarian’ alternative to global capitalism, these radicals sought to not just free those newly independent nations from the Global North’s economic control, but also those ‘postcolonial citizens’ exploited in the metropoles itself. Lastly, Getachew (2019: 20–21) discusses the notion of a ‘global Jim Crow’, highlighting how rather than being an idiosyncrasy of the US South, ‘the color line was an international phenomenon of which segregation and racial domination in the United States were only a domestic iteration’.

Indeed, it may seem almost too obvious of a point to make that racism is connected to the processes of colonialism and neo-colonialism. After all, ‘the concept of race was thus the glue that stuck the colonial world order together, as it became common-sense knowledge that there was a global racial hierarchy which permitted the colonization of the “lesser” races by the dominant white Europeans’ (Meghji, 2020a: 4). Nevertheless, if we look at dominant approaches in the sociology of race, then such transnational connections tend to be elided. Instead, much sociology of race tends to be characterised by a methodological nationalism in which it becomes sociologically viable – and advisable – to study racism within the confines of particular, discrete nation states (Meghji, Forthcoming). However, such methodological nationalism is not analytically useful for our current predicaments. It is the same social system that exploits the labour of children in China to make electronic goods, that exploits the (disproportionately Black and Brown) zero-hour contracted truck driver who delivers this product to its eventual owner in the West; it is the same imperialised-racialised principle that Islam is opposed to modernity that justifies the state surveillance of Muslims under the Patriot Act in the United States and the Prevent counter-terrorism programme in Britain, that justifies Western military intervention in the Middle East under the guise of civilizing the backwards world. While neither Getachew, Desai, or Gopal’s books are explicitly about the links between racism and imperialism, they each highlight that there is a radical tradition of thought which has always analysed these two processes in tandem with one another. The fact that this tradition already exists pushes me to my next point, as I argue that the sociology of race needs to adopt a more historical approach.

Looking backwards to move forwards

While each of the three reviewed books use historical methods, each of them also reflects on our present conjunctures. Getachew (2019: 181) points out that the ‘worldmakers of decolonization’ offer an intellectual tradition through which to think about contemporary transnational movements such as ‘the Movement for Black Lives, the Caribbean demand for reparations for slavery and genocide, and South African calls for a social and economic decolonization’. Similarly, Gopal (2019: 448) argues the dispelling the myth of British colonial benevolence, and centering anticolonial agency, allows us to both move beyond the idea that Britain is a global superpower that has the legitimacy to intervene across the globe, as well as allowing ‘Britons to lay claim to a different, more challenging history [. . .] which can draw on multiple historical and cultural resources’. Lastly, Desai (2020) argues that his book highlights historical themes that still shape the present day, such as the United States’ claim of being the champion of liberalism and democracy while it still routinely kills many of its citizens (and those around the world).

In short, therefore, each of the three authors stress the necessity of having a historical sensibility to comprehend current situations and social processes. At the very same time as they are developing such temporal linkages, however, we are seeing increased attempts within the sociology of race to bifurcate the study of racism away from its historical roots in colonialism (and consequently, its contemporary basis in neo-colonialism). If we take critical race theory, for instance, Bonilla-Silva (2015: 74) even goes as far as to say that this paradigm ought to move beyond ‘the sins [of the] past (e.g., slavery, colonization, and genocide)’ in studying the ‘contemporary foundation’ of racism. Of course, Bonilla-Silva has apt reasons for his methodological scope – by reducing racism to being a consequence of past events, we lose sight of how racism continues because it still benefits people in the present day, who consequently maintain an interest in reproducing it. Nevertheless, we have to question whether being captured in a methodological ‘presentism’, which explicitly attempts to bifurcate the study of the present from its past, is analytically viable when it comes to the processes of racialisation and racism.

Very often, for instance, what we immediately think of as a social process specific to our present racialised social structure in fact has a much longer history informed by the logics of coloniality. For instance, consider the case of the militarisation of the police in the United States – a key issue in contemporary racism. As Go (2020) shows, such militarisation of the United States’ police started in the early 20th century primarily as a means of punitively surveying and controlling the racially subdominant. However, the tactics used by this police – such as the creation of mobile squads and intelligence divisions – derived from the United States’ military practices in their colonies (Go, 2020). In this regard, Go creates a temporal link between a contemporary issue of police militarisation with its historical origins, and also a transnational link between ‘racism at home’ with the US’ ‘imperialism abroad’ in a way that transcends bifurcated understandings of racialized processes.

Without necessarily having it as their primary focus, therefore, Getachew, Gopal, and Desai each show the possibilities for social analysis that can be opened up if we retain a historical focus when looking at contemporary society. Through appreciating the historical linkages with contemporary racism, we become better placed to connect with the various intellectual paradigms which dedicated themselves to dismantling this system in the fight for social justice. It is this theme of social justice that we now turn to.

Towards anti-racist, anti-colonial solidarities

A recurrent theme runs through each of the reviewed books: the importance of forging transnational solidarities. Gopal (2019) shows how anticolonial radicals in Britain centred solidarity – in the sense of multicultural, transnational, crossorganisational coalitions – in their struggles against the British empire, meaning that thinkers in the metropoles, such as Frederic Harrison and Arthur Ballard, came to argue that the British ruling class’ fascism in the colonies, in the name of capital accumulation, could be connected with their exploitation of white British workers. Similarly, Desai’s (2020: 45) concept of ‘transnational refraction’ was built around the premise that anti-imperialists thought about colonialism and racism through the sense of shared struggle and solidarity, citing, for instance Saint Nihal Singh’s argument that there was a fundamental ‘link between the Asian migrant laborer [in the United States], the African American subject, and the colonized Indian, each connected the other by the sheer fact of being on the wrong side of the color line’. Desai (2020: 199) even concludes his book with the assertion that such transnational refraction is a prerequisite for solidarity, when he comments that: ‘solidarity emerges only out of a wilful act of seeing through the eyes of another, whose life we can only understand in glimpses’. Lastly, Getachew (2019: 145) too notes that anticolonial nationalists ‘fashioned Third World solidarity as a form of international class politics, and demanded redistribution on the basis that postcolonial states had in fact produced the wealth the West enjoyed’.

Each of these authors focuses on transnational, multicultural, multiorganisational forms of solidarity not because it is historically interesting, but because history has shown us that these forms of solidarity are successful and necessary in the struggles for social justice. I make this point not because the sociology of race is wilfully ignoring the importance of such solidarity, but because the issues of racism facing us in the contemporary and future world need to replicate these forms of solidarity fostered by the anticolonial radicals recounted in these three books. When we think of the climate crisis, for instance, a solidarity needs to be forged between the poor workers across the West (many of whom areracialised as Black and Brown) who are disproportionately exposed to air pollution, with the environmental destruction faced by indigenous people across Latin America, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the name of capital accumulation, who also in turn need to form a solidarity with those in South Asia facing starvation due to droughts, who in turn need to form solidarities with those in the Caribbean, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, where cyclones and hurricanes have been creating humanitarian crises. When we think of Islamophobia, we need to form a solidarity between those campaigning against the punitive surveillance of, and state violence towards, Muslims in the West, with those campaigning against the Uyghur detention camps in China, and the Hindutva violence towards Muslims in Kashmir. When it comes to race and racism, we are always talking about transnational, historically, epistemically, and spatially connected social processes, and – as Getachew rightfully highlights – ‘worldmaking’ processes of inequality require equally global solidarities and projects of resistance.

#### Our alternative – We should adopt the principle of sovereignty as non-domination. Non-domination flips responsibility and accountability against powerful actors.

Adom **GETACHEW** Poli Sci @ Chicago **’19** *Worldmaking after Empire* p. 30-34

Toward a Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism

Theorizing from the specificity of the postcolonial condition also offers critical resources in normative debates about sovereignty and the international order. Against the backdrop of self-determination’s fall, political theorists and philosophers reframed their questions about justice and legitimacy from a global perspective. Historically, these disciplines viewed the domestic sphere and particularly the “sovereign state as the consummation of political experience and activity” and thus limited normative theorizing to questions of domestic politics.68 However, beginning in the 1970s and in a more sustained fashion after the end of the Cold War, the global turn in political theory questioned this disaggregation of the domestic and international and subjected the international to normative theorizing. Fueling this body of work was a confrontation with the nation-state’s empirical and normative limits. On the one hand, the stylized self-sufficient state, which served as the backdrop for John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, appeared entirely out of sync with the growing interdependence wrought by economic globalization. In his early critique of Rawls’s assumptions about self-sufficient states, Charles Beitz drew on the growing role of multinational corporations and transnational capital flows to argue that “international economic cooperation creates a new basis for international morality.”69 For Beitz and the field of global justice that emerged in the wake of this intervention, this account of economic globalization made it possible to theorize redistributive obligations beyond the state.

By the end of the Cold War, the growing layers of international legal, political, and economic interdependence also opened up new possibilities for rethinking the political institutions of the international order. In this context, a “fortress-like conception of state sovereignty,” which historically gave states a monopoly on internal political and economic decision-making, was giving way to international institutions and particularly international human rights law that sought to limit and tame state action.70 According to Habermas, these developments signaled a growing transformation of “international law as a law of states into cosmopolitan law as a law of individuals.”71 In this context, Habermas and others have examined the prospects for a constitutionalization of international law that does not aim at the formation of a world state, but disaggregates sovereignty such that the limited functions of securing peace and protecting human rights are lodged in a supranational institution while intermediary and regional institutions address arenas of growing interdependence such as economic and environmental policy.72

While the field of cosmopolitan political theory includes debates that range from global distributional justice to the constitutionalization of regional and international organizations, a central assumption of this perspective is that we now occupy a post-Westphalian world order. On this view, an international order governed by the principles of state sovereignty, equality, and nonintervention can be dated to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and was progressively expanded and extended in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As noted above, decolonization is often viewed as the culmination of this process. At the same time, this moment of its universalization is said to coincide with economic and political transformations that chipped away at the normative model of the “self-determining sovereign national state.”73 Thus, while decolonization made the Westphalian model universal, it quickly became “an anachronism.”74

This invocation of “Westphalian sovereignty” is often taken to be a conceptual construct rather than a lived reality. But even when this is acknowledged, the division of Westphalian and post-Westphalian elides the continuities between our international past and present by obscuring the ways in which empire was and continues to be constitutive of international society. An expansive view of empire as a practice and structure of unequal integration rather than simply alien rule highlights the deep continuities between the Westphalian and post-Westphalian world orders. For instance, far from being unprecedented, contemporary economic globalization should be situated within a long history of an imperial global economy. The “density, the speed, and the impact of the global flows” that emerged from the first colonial encounters in the Americas were already planetary in the fifteenth century and restructured political and economic relations within and beyond the Atlantic world.75 This economic integration often took the form of a “non-colonial imperialism” that secured economic access and domination through indirect forms of coercion.76 Contemporary conditions—such as the outsized power of private corporations, the role of international institutions in ensuring the unfettered movement of capital, and the inequalities this era of globalization has generated—build on these imperial foundations and reproduce the logics of unequal integration.

And as was the case prior to decolonization, relations of economic dependence and inequality are often coupled with legal and political modes of unequal membership in international society. While decolonization is associated with the extension of formal rights to all states, legal handicaps written into the process of decolonization set limits on the sovereignty of postcolonial states.77 Thus, even at the moment associated with the culmination of Westphalian sovereignty, juridical equality was aspirational rather than fully realized. More recently, international lawyers and scholars of international relations have abandoned even the normative and aspirational commitment to sovereign equality, arguing for a return to modes of conditional and limited membership for states deemed outlaws, failed, or rogue.78 The explicit defense of a hierarchically organized international order coincides with the growing power of institutions like the UN Security Council and the unilateralism of the United States.79 Rather than view the international order through the dichotomy of Westphalian and post-Westphalian, we should understand it as an imperial world order that was challenged by projects of anticolonial worldmaking and was reconstituted.

The persistence of unequal integration and hierarchy calls for a postcolonial cosmopolitanism that recenters the problem of empire. Drawing on the critique of international hierarchy and the anticolonial efforts to build a world after empire, which are reconstructed in the following pages, this model of cosmopolitanism is less aimed at the limits of the nation-state and more concerned with the ways that relations of hierarchy continue to create differentiated modes of sovereignty and reproduce domination in the international sphere. As described above, hierarchy designates not hegemony, but processes of integration and interaction that produce unevenly distributed rights, obligations, and burdens. These processes of unequal integration are structural and embedded in the institutional arrangements of the international order. They create the international conditions of ongoing imperial domination.

With its critical and diagnostic orientation focused on the present configurations of international hierarchy, the normative and utopian core of a postcolonial cosmopolitanism remains the principle of nondomination at the center of anticolonial worldmaking.80 Nondomination recasts the current configurations of international hierarchy as infringements on collective projects of self-government. This approach contrasts with an account of the injustices of the international sphere that is primarily concerned with the violation of individual human rights. While international human rights protections have provided important resources in challenging international hierarchy and can be combined with collective claims for self-government, on their own they offer a limited account of the wrongs involved.81 For instance, the expansive claims of private corporations not only undermine individual human rights but also threaten the capacity of self-government insofar as corporate prerogatives erode guarantees secured through state constitutions and national legislation. An emphasis on nondomination thus broadens our account of the injustices that unequal integration and international hierarchy engender. Moreover, as the examples of anticolonial worldmaking suggest, realizing the international condition of nondomination necessary to self-government can extend beyond a defense of the state to include more demanding internationalisms.

In this dual focus on hierarchy and nondomination, a postcolonial cosmopolitanism offers a more circumspect approach to the antistatist orientation of the cosmopolitan turn in political theory. In championing the equal moral worth of persons against the morally arbitrary nature of nation-states, cosmopolitan theorists have advocated taming the state through international law and have expanded the reach of our political and moral obligations. However, this privileging and prioritization of the moral worth of individuals coincides with the normative diminution of collective claims to sovereignty and self-determination, which have historically served to restrain imperialism. As Jean Cohen has argued, in “prematurely drop[ping] the concept of sovereignty” and “assum[ing] that a constitutional cosmopolitan legal order already exists which has or should replace international law,” cosmopolitans risk “becoming apologists for neo-imperial projects.”82 Viewing sovereignty as primarily an impediment to securing the rights of individuals provides cover for imperial practices cynically masked as humanitarian efforts and leaves insufficient normative resources to distinguish and critique imperial and hierarchical curtailments of sovereignty.

This is not an argument for retreating into a defensive sovereigntist position, which cannot provide adequate critical and normative resources to address the contemporary dilemmas of the international order, and it should be clear that the postcolonial approach outlined here does not offer an exhaustive theory of the international order. But in returning to the problem of empire, it provides a readjustment of what we take to be the central conundrums and predicaments of international politics. Moreover, it reminds us that claims of sovereignty and sovereign equality not only have preserved the state against claims of international justice by creating a hermetic seal but also have served as the foundation of anti-imperial visions of international justice. These principles provide bulwarks against hierarchy and resources for resisting domination in the international sphere, while also making possible ambitious visions of the international redistribution of political and economic power.

### 1NC – T

#### Topical affirmatives must increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of core antitrust laws.

#### The affirmative is not topical. “United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government – the affirmative does not advocate action by the USFG.

Organisation OECD for Economic Co-operation and Development Council ’87 “United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179]

1. Political and organisational structure of government

The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of **three branches**: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### The Sherman, Clayton, and FTC act are the core laws.

Gibbs ‘ND [Gibbs Law Group; “The Sherman Antitrust Act”; https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/federal-laws/sherman-act/; AS]

The Sherman Antitrust Act is one of three core federal antitrust laws, along with the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

#### Prohibitions are laws.

Dictionary.com ‘ND [Dictionary.com; “Prohibition” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/prohibition; AS]

a law or decree that forbids.

#### Their interpretation explodes predictable limits — non-topical advocacies encourage the affirmative to dodge negative strategies, which are all based on a predictable reading of the resolution — the negative requires pre-round research in order to stand a chance against the affirmative’s infinite preparation and use of traditional standards of debate such as permutations — including their affirmative makes negative research an impossibility, even if we have “ground” to debate them — it greenlights any methodology or orientation that is tangentially related to the topic — negative preparation requires in depth case negatives

#### Two impacts:

#### Procedural fairness — debate is a game and we are all here to win — debate is a competitive activity and requires game values to function — this is the largest impact — we have all chosen to spend our weekend here in order to compete

#### Clash — you should privilege debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm — unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory — promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate

### 1NC – Cognition K

#### The aff’s call for anarchism of thought relies on a vision of the “cerebral subject” that can take a “cognitive leap” out of the racial capitalism. The descriptive statement of the cerebral subject cannot use the tools of bio-symbolic racial capitalism against itself.

Max **HANTEL** Women’s & Gender Studies @ Rutgers **’20** “Plasticity and Fungibility: On Sylvia Wynter’s Pieza Framework” *Social Text* 143 38 (3) p. 99-105

1. Who Are We? Approaching the Neurobiological in Genre Studies

How did people in Europe at the turn of the fifteenth century respond to the question, Who are we? This is (one place) where Wynter begins her profound meditations on the human and humanisms. She argues that the dominant understanding of human being in medieval Latin-Christian Europe produced a theocentric answer. “We” lay people are fallen, marked by original sin, and so subordinated to a church and clergy that possess the only route to true knowledge of the cosmos. Wynter calls these dominant orders descriptive statements, following Gregory Bateson, to index how they self-stabilize over time like a living system maintaining homeostasis. And so, the theocentric descriptive statement she calls the Christian drowns out all competing answers.

A shift occurs in the fifteenth century, however, and a perturbation in the Christian descriptive statement becomes a profound disruption. The Christian is destabilized to the point of incoherence, and a new descriptive statement emerges as the dominant order of being and knowledge: ratiocentric Man. The lay humanists of the Renaissance, led by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and his Oration on the Dignity of Man (1496), propose a hybridly religious-secular figure put here on a shared Earth to “make of himself what he willed to be.” We are now men of reason, looking for earthly salvation in emergent state forms and systematically mapping global space and peoples. A debate ensues: if reason is what separates and indeed elevates humans above nature, what about the “Indians” of the New World or the children of Ham in Africa? Different empires put their own spin on it but together create a world economic system made possible by ontological degrees of humanity.

Another perturbation: ratiocentric Man had held on inelegantly to an origin story from the previous descriptive statement. We are Men of reason, yes, but created and chosen by God to reign over the earth and the many creatures that lack our perfectibility. Charles Darwin would breach the human/animal divide, again remapping human difference in terms of biology through his theory of evolution. Along with the life sciences come more sophisticated forms of demography and economics as a science of scarcity, producing the new figure of biocentric Man (Man2, for Wynter, to ratiocentric Man’s Man1). At the turn of the twentieth century, how do “we” now answer the question? We are biological creatures caught in a natural struggle for resources and only confirm our relative success through the accumulation of wealth. If the Great Chain of Being under the order of Man1 denied the humanity of the colonized, the enslaved, and the “primitive” because of their lack of rationality, the order of Man2 sees mass dispossession and material deprivation as confirmation of evolutionary dysselection along a global color line.

This rendering of Wynter’s central historical argument is schematic but reflects her fundamental concern: is a different, nonreductive, “ecumenically human” answer possible to the question, Who are we? Through successive onto-epistemological regimes (Christian, Man1, Man2), a single genre of being human has substituted for generic referent of humanity. Just as Mirandola and Darwin destabilized the dominant descriptive statement of their day, what perturbations to the system of Man2 might today generate a fundamental transformation that outstrips homeostatic regulation and produces a new conception of the human? One might step back here and ask why Wynter uses the cybernetic, biochemical, and neurobiological language of descriptive statements, homeostasis, perturbations, and phase-changes. Indeed, you could follow the narrative shift from Christian to Man1 to Man2 in many explanatory grammars: singular great men of history, shifts in material conditions of production and subsequent cultural struggles for hegemony, responses to external shocks brought on by ecological contingencies. Instead, Wynter proposes a biosemiotic theory that requires an account of neuroplasticity, relying precisely on the scientific tools of description formed in the wake of Man2. Here is her summary of this method as it combines biological-cognitive studies of cultural formations with Richard Dawkins’s universal Darwinism: Central to the study of these bio-implementing conditions will be that of the co-functioning of each cosmogonically chartered, sociogenic replicator code’s system of positive/negative, symbolic life/death meanings with the biochemical or opiate reward/punishment (i.e., placebo/nocebo) behavior motivating/ demotivating system of the brain (Danielli, 1980; Goldstein, 1994; Stein, 2007). For this biochemical system of reward and punishment in our uniquely human case, as proposed by the above, is systemically activated by each such sociogenic code’s representation of symbolic life and death.8 The centuries-long story of the transition from Christian to Man1 to Man2 is animated by an input-output system of feedback loops between the brain and (primarily) rhetorical and symbolic descriptive statements. There is a replicator code of symbolic life and death that spreads and regenerates by activating a neurochemical reaction in the brain, specifically opiate reward pathways. This model is explicitly in line with Dawkins’s “selfish gene,” since Wynter suggests that the replicator-vehicle distinction essential to his theory obtains for sociobiological laws of culture under current conditions. So just as organisms defined as vehicles serve as the site of natural selection for the replicators inside (namely, DNA molecules in various compositions), human beings have also subordinated themselves to cultural replicator codes (such as race, gender, class, and sexuality).9

Dawkins might agree with the above, since it neatly mirrors his work on memes as a nongenetic form of natural selection that recapitulates the vehicle-replicator distinction in the realm of culture. It is here, however, where she parts ways with Dawkins, because the memetic analysis is precisely an effect of the “overrepresentation of Man” in her telling. Or, more simply, while the replicator codes may indeed have a deterministic effect on the otherwise irrelevant vehicles for biological creatures, humans are not actually subordinated to their cultural replicator codes; we simply believe ourselves to be. Here, the other element of her scientific model, the biochemistry of endogenous opioids, returns to produce a way out of the seeming dilemma of being a mere vehicle working for a code.

While Dawkins’s thoroughgoing Darwinism might just work for the rest of life, humans have a distinctly Lamarckian flair: the “performative behavioral-enactment of ourselves.”10 This revolutionary transformation suggests a new answer to the question of who we are. By embracing the “empirical reality of our collective human Agency and . . . fully realized cognitive autonomy as a species,” we can “consciously now remake” those descriptive statements that have continually substituted a single genre of human being for the whole of humanity.11 We created these sociogenic replicator codes; we can change them.

As is already clear, there is a tension in her historical account of the overrepresentation of Man insofar as she relies on the onto-epistemological commitments of a Man2 descriptive statement to interpret the longue durée of human history and make the case for a true humanism. Formally speaking, this tension is fundamental to many debates in critical theory: we construct our visions of transformation and emancipation in the language of the present. How else could we? In Wynter’s case, however, neuroplasticity takes on a much more specific and important role. Neuroplasticity, and more precisely our awareness of it and mapping of its mechanisms, represents the condition of possibility for a new descriptive statement and an ontological shift in human being as profound as the emergence of language 200,000 years ago. By taking control of the rhetorical-neurological feedback loops in the brain, “we humans no longer need the illusions of our hitherto story-telling, extra-human projection of that Agency.”12 With the illusion lifted by contemporary neuroscience research, a new answer to the question Who are we? emerges: “A hybrid biological and meta-biological species” that consciously and collectively creates “a new kind of planetarily extended cum ‘intercommunal’ community.”13

Across the breadth of the secondary literature on Wynter, the neurobiological scaffolding of her theory is differentially emphasized. As with any great thinker, there is the quick footnote version of Wynter, increasingly popular, that tends to grasp onto the seductive directness of her cybernetic neuroscience to quickly signal a materialist or scientifically inflected cultural studies. In more extended treatments by some of her most insightful interlocutors, different articulations of the neurobiological are at work. Take, for example, four brief discussions from recent work that, when juxtaposed, create a helpful continuum for approaching the science question.

First, David Marriott argues that Wynter’s deployment of science ultimately traps her theory in the very regime of overrepresentation she wishes to transcend because of her reliance on neuroscience as an empirical and transparent window into human existence (even as she occasionally expresses caution against positivism or acknowledges epistemological limits). “By writing history as scientific text, Wynter moves toward a posi- tion that implies that scientific method exceeds narratives (even those of racist illusion), but science also forecloses the textuality of history (and so, presumably, that of rhetoric).”14 Thinking with Marriott, then, we might register the somewhat jarring effect of reading Wynter’s full-throated critique of Darwinian “biocentric” accounts of the human undergirded by Richard Dawkins, who represents perhaps the apotheosis of the Darwinian synthesis.

Second, Alexander Weheliye seems to agree that the neurobiological approach brings with it considerable risk if read as an empiricism, but he posits a strategic reason for its deployment separated from any specific truth to this or that scientific claim. As he puts it, “Wynter’s description of the autopoiesis of the human stretches Fanon’s concept of sociogeny by grounding it in an, albeit false or artificial, physiological reality.”15 The discussion of an opiate reward system is not necessarily true, nor does it need to be on this reading, but it points to how sociogenic codes like race, class, or gender, as part of the master code of the overrepresentation of Man, “become anchored in the ontogenic flesh.”16 While Weheliye does not extend the argument, one could plausibly assert, then, that any scientific theory of the nature-culture interface would serve just as well. The fact that Wynter tends toward two Darwinists (Richard Dawkins and Gerald Edelman) rather than, say, various contemporary neo-Lamarckians, is incidental.

Third, Katherine McKittrick lays out the ambivalent but generative role of science in Wynter’s thought, tracing how Wynter simultaneously outlines the “always already” racializing effects of (Western) science with the possibility for drawing scientific discourses into the struggle for a “cognitive leap.”17 We need not cede the terrain of scientific discourse to those who continue to deploy it along racial and colonial lines: “Scientific racism cannot have the last word.”18 Indeed, for McKittrick, to accept a stark division between the objective world of science and the creative world of arts and the humanities is to reify a key component of the overrepresentation of Man. On this reading, Wynter is indeed intentional and careful about the scientific structure she builds and its empirical validity but crucially understands this as a two-way conversation and a site of agonistic collaboration.

Fourth, Demetrius Eudell looks closely at the neurobiological substrate of Wynter’s theory, centering the opiate reward system (and the specific studies cited by Wynter) as the key to a theory of overrepresentation: “Linked to the functioning of the human code, as the research on addiction conducted by the neurobiologist Avram Goldstein has revealed, are adaptive behaviors driven by a reward and punishment mechanism in the brain in which a natural opioid system is triggered with the performance of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviors.”19 Eudell focuses on the relevant neuro transmitters in this theory (“probably beta-endorphin”), articulating Wynter’s intervention vis-à- vis the scientific scaffolding of her footnotes to foreground neurochemical-rhetorical feedback loops as the empirical basis for a new humanism.

To be clear, these brief summaries do not adequately convey the richness of each discussion, all from thinkers to whom I am deeply indebted. And I do not pose them to try to adjudicate who wore it best, so to speak. Instead, the four positions I have schematically sketched form a suggestive continuum to describe the deployment of neurobiology in Wynter’s work: scientism, false (but useful), ambivalent (and generative), empirical. And of course, the four positions are not neatly separable. In general, they all share an account of genre studies that primarily focuses on two key aspects (with differing evaluations): first, rhetorical-neurobiological feedback loops as the material structure of sociogenic replicator codes forming the engine of overrepresentation; and second, the disruption and possible rewriting of those codes by liminal subjects. Liminal subjects, as the name implies, exist inside the system of overrepresentation through their constitutive exclusion and so index and create the push to a radical outside.

The metabiological human Wynter describes — homo narrans, the marriage of bios and mythos — is clearly a “cerebral subject.”20 Even as she critiques the biological reductionism of Man2 (primarily the reduction to genetics represented by DNA as master code), she posits the path beyond through the unique capacities of the prefrontal cortex and the simultaneously transhistorical and culturally specific power of opioid reward systems in the brain.21 She clearly and powerfully suggests that humans are not actually subservient to the rhetorical codes to which they give up their agency; cognitive autonomy means achieving self-recognition as cerebral subjects and so taking up the challenge of transforming the “replicator codes” of “symbolic life/death” that strengthen and regenerate through our neural reward pathways.

In a sense, Wynter’s account here of neuroplasticity is not plastic enough. As Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb argue, “The distinction between genelike replicators and phenotype-vehicles breaks down. . . . Behaviors and ideas (memes) are reconstructed by individuals and groups (vehicles).”22 In maintaining the distinct separation of replicator codes, (like as abstracted, from the localizable brain, as the vehicle for such codes race or gender), she implicitly relies on the interchangeability of different bodies and a hard border between the brain as self and the world around it.23 The result is that when Wynter describes humans as enacting the self through “genre-specific” codes (such as race, gender, sexuality, class), a scalar confusion results. If these are all “codewords for genre,” how do they congeal (or not) into the overall replicator code Man?24 Is the master code a site of emergence, or is it what determines the code words from above? While the complexity of her work and her appeal to cybernetic language suggest more than simply an additive model at work (race + gender + class), the input-output system of a neurochemical “good” and “bad” in the brain backgrounds embodiment in specific social-ecological systems and foregrounds the code itself. The result is a mechanistic, bloodless understanding of the struggle over replicators that fails to describe how race and gender constitute Man. The next section outlines this tendency in Wynter’s work, as well as in Wynter studies more broadly, giving particular attention to how this neurobiological turn obscures the importance of gender as a language of embodiment in much of her previous work.

#### Don’t start with cognition – their vision of a cognitive revolution reproduces the overrepresentation of bioeconomic Man.

Max **HANTEL** Women’s & Gender Studies @ Rutgers **’20** “Plasticity and Fungibility: On Sylvia Wynter’s Pieza Framework” *Social Text* 143 38 (3) p. 97-99

In an assessment of C. L. R. James’s “popular aesthetics” in his novels and autobiographical writing, Sylvia Wynter argues that he resolves the “class/ race and class/sex dispute by revealing each as aspects of the language of the other.”1 This revelation comes in the form of the pieza conceptual frame. Named for the pieza, the standard unit of measurement created by Portuguese slave traders in the sixteenth century for African slaves, the pieza frame highlights the invention of human fungibility at the outset of the slave trade and the global economic system it would generate. The exchangeable, standardized Black body becomes “the general equivalent of physical labor value against which all the others could be measured.”2 Importantly, on Wynter’s reading of James, the pieza framework initiates a fundamental transformation in political-economic and philosophical accounts of the human such that it quickly spreads beyond the specifics of a particular transaction category and even beyond the historical period of transatlantic slavery. “In the Jamesian system, the pieza becomes an ever-more general category of value, establishing equivalences between a wider variety of oppressed labor power.”3 How does the figure of the pieza born in the sixteenth century and tied here to questions of labor resolve the triangulation of class, race, and gender? And in what ways does it live beyond its specific historical use if, writing in 1992, Wynter proposes the pieza framework as a crucial theoretical intervention opening up “a vision of life that unfurls new vistas on a livable future, both for ourselves and the socio-biosphere we inhabit”?4

These questions run against the grain of Wynter’s most recent work, as well as the increasingly vast secondary literature that focuses on her theory of the “overrepresentation of Man.” In such work, aesthetics, political economy, and such categories as race, class, or gender emerge through a simplified account of neuroplasticity that takes the form of feedback loops between cultural codes and the various neurochemical systems they activate or deactivate. To be clear, her inimitable oeuvre represents some of the most important ongoing provocations to the humanistic sciences and continues to inspire imaginings of a world otherwise. She returns us to the question of the human in new and profound ways that are particularly important in this moment of ecocrisis. Indeed, as the final quotation in the last paragraph suggests, she has continually shared with us (whether anyone would listen or not) a forceful critique of the violent entanglement of the denial of humanity and environmental destruction. Thus, my concern in this article is to reemphasize the central importance of the pieza framework in Wynter’s theory of the human and to recontextualize the neurobiological turn in Wynter studies in terms of the invention of human fungibility. Without such a reordering, her powerful critique of the relationships among race, gender, and political economy ends up reduced to a mechanistic neuroplasticity that localizes the historical effects of slavery, colonialism, and capitalism in the brain while narrowly imagining collective transformation as a reordering of neural reward pathways. Reading Sylvia Wynter’s work against itself is an important exercise at this moment when her approach to a science of the word has rightfully invigorated new materialist thought and feminist science studies. Her critique of Man is mobilized against the flattening tendencies of the so-called ontological turn, particularly as the latter assumes a seamless transference between descriptive projects and ethicopolitical commitments. Take, for instance, the critical condensation around the Anthropocene, deeply invested in interrogating the -cene (from kainos, “new”) aspect of the current crisis with markedly less attention to the slow sedimentation of anthropos over the past five hundred years. Wynter’s many decades of sensitive attention to the texture of human strata have made her work a vital part of correcting this myopic imbalance, especially as she began connecting the violent production of Man to climate crisis as early as her open letter concerning Rodney King in 1994.5

I have written in other contexts about how Afro-Caribbean thought is expropriated and exported for general consumption, uprooted from lived landscapes and put into circulation as a colorful commodity, or what Edouard Glissant called “flowers without fragrance.”6 This concern is not a call for Caribbean philosophical purity or an argument that Afro-Caribbean thinkers are reducible to their bodies and the land. Instead, it is an attempt to trace how the political economy of fungibility, the ontologizing technology Wynter calls the pieza framework, shapes critical discourse and political possibility under neoliberalism. As Wynter’s work becomes a trajectory unto itself in feminist science studies, the seeming isomorphism of description and transformation in new materialism and the flattened ontology of the human against which she has written so eloquently risks being reanimated in the form of the neuroplastic species, the cerebral human qua human, the self as feedback loop.7 The result, as I argue here, is a domesticated critique of the overrepresentation of Man that fails to challenge racial capitalism and recapitulates the now mainstream division between economics and identity politics, a strategic chasm in which our ability to imagine new collective futures is lost. Wynter’s elaboration of the pieza framework is a warning for how quickly a vision of the world otherwise can become a source of neoliberal regeneration and how a new critique of political economy must begin with the ruthless rejection of fungibility in its many guises.

#### Our alternative – we need a revolution of mind-body, not the mind. Rejecting the descriptive statement of humans as cerebral subjects is necessary to combat fungibility.

Max **HANTEL** Women’s & Gender Studies @ Rutgers **’20** “Plasticity and Fungibility: On Sylvia Wynter’s Pieza Framework” *Social Text* 143 38 (3) p. 108-111

Here, Wynter pushes us to interlink the gendered dynamics of the seminal — the father’s seed, the exclusively patrilineal account of the human that relies on the invisiblization of the maternal body in the name of the self-propagating Man — to the process of racialization through enslavement. Thus, this historical conjunction renders monoconceptual frames inadequate to the descriptive task of accounting for overrepresentation and the ethical task of overcoming it. Instead, Wynter proposes the pieza framework, shifting the terms of Irigaray’s “Women on the Market” in a fundamental way: The pieza was the name given by the Portuguese, during the slave trade, to the African who functioned as the standard measure. He was a man of twenty-five years, approximately, in good health, calculated to give a certain amount of physical labor. He served as the general equivalent of physical labor value against which all the others could be measured — with, for example, three teenagers equaling one pieza, and older men and women thrown in a job lot as refuse.45

As Man1 becomes the reigning Western ontologism, it rearticulates the terms of exchange between assigned categories of “male” and “female” according to the dominant life/death distinction of Man (as generic human) and his native/negro others. The pieza framework focuses on the body evacuated of meaning and subordinated to all other categories of social meaning so that it can mediate socioeconomic exchanges under a specific genre. The Black body as the zero point of humanity is what enables the mode of domination, slavery, and colonialism, which in turn animates the Marxist category of the mode of production: “The pieza framework required a repositioning of the mode of production in relation to the mode of domination. The former becomes a subset of the latter.”46 Beyond just a narrow critique of Marxism, the pieza framework articulates how genre studies works as a pluriconceptual theoretics beyond even the powerful but limited imaginary of intersectionality as a spatial model where multiple, independent axes converge.

First, the pieza framework explicitly draws upon Michel Foucault’s theory of power as fluid and mobile, strategic but nonintentional, showing how the reigning descriptive statement of Man functions. That is to say, any single axis of oppression, indeed the very notion that we can imagine a “single axis” in isolation, looks much different through the world of the pieza framework inaugurated in the fifteenth century. A single axis like race or class or gender enters into relations of becoming only through a dual process. First, it is animated by the dominant code of symbolic life and death that makes it a meaningful distinction in the elaboration of a specific human kind. So if Man stands in as the generic referent of humanity, a category like race is mobilized vis-à- vis the regeneration of that descriptive statement rather than in the name of the category itself.47 Hence, the pieza framework established by Portuguese traders through economic-symbolic feedback loops and globalized through the Atlantic slave trade becomes the immediate field of emergence for other differences to register as coherent demarcations. One can imagine this historical scenario logically, in the sense that the post-1492 ontologism of Man described by Wynter renders all judgments of gender or class difference seeable and sayable through specific forms of racial difference — such as the preceding discussion of “Black women” where one cannot imagine positioning them as women alone (vis-à- vis sexual difference) untouched by racialization in the context of Man1 or Man2.

Second, the animation of the socioeconomic field by a specific ontologism also means a given differentiation takes hold in the autoinstitution of the human only by way of multiple sites of oppression. If no one category has meaning outside of the dominant code of life and death, the corollary is that one category’s valence — in the literal sense of its power through combination — can be traced only through how it pervades the material-semiotic body by way of multiple sites of oppression. The subjectivizing power of race, in that sense, takes hold through its coarticulation with a category like gender such that what it means to embody the feminine symbolic order is simultaneously the autoinstitution of whiteness. This point speaks to Wynter’s wariness of contemporary feminism for how it invisibilizes the constitution of woman-as- whiteness such that it ends up thinking within the ideological coordinates of the overrepresentation of Man. To address ourselves to one immobile axis of differentiation, or even to imagine that one could neatly divide up axes of differentiation and freeze them in place until the moment of intersection, is precisely an effect of overrepresentation, a second-order ideological structure of the descriptive statement of Man taken as its truth. The pieza framework establishes a mode of understanding the simultaneous persistence and dynamism of identity categories like race, class, and gender, their unceasing processes of becoming that still anchor the powerful hold of the reign of Man.

Notably, the pieza framework is a crucial moment of transformation in Wynter’s view when the terms of economic exchange became defined by an ontopolitics of the human. The fungible mediating term of the pieza — the standard enslaved Black — becomes the site of relation for global economic expansion that is both condition and result of modernity/ coloniality. This taxonomy of the pieza as the standard unit by which differences across race, class, gender, and nationality can be understood installs gradations of value at the level of the human and an economy of scarcity and comparative advantage at the level of the body in a manner that outlives the specific accounting function of this or that standard unit. Insisting on the pieza framework, instead, is about understanding why the kind of deracialized exchange of women proposed by Irigaray or the desexualized and deracialized exchange of labor exploitation proposed by Karl Marx fails to adequately diagram the economy of life and death after 1492. Importantly, moreover, it also exposes the limits of a critical frame focused exclusively on a metaphysics of Blackness, because the pieza’s fungibility is mobilized only in relation to multiple modes of identification and position (a sort of perverse checklist akin to Audre Lorde’s insistence on age, race, sex, class)48 and insofar as it moves through processes of exchange. With that in mind, the pieza framework is not simply passed down through the generations unchanged by historical contingency or untouched by political-economic feedback loops. It represents the starting point for a dynamic way of understanding the global economic spacing of racialization through multiple sites of difference. And to return to the previous section’s discussion of neurobiology, the pieza framework also challenges the appearance of the vehicle/replicator distinction as gaining coherence through an inevitably racialized conception of the interchangeable body. Using an input-output model of mechanistic neuroplasticity to describe a sociogenic code like race moving from brain to brain fails to engage this multiplicity that Wynter herself insists on. If the pieza is the source of extractive value, then it recursively shifts along with the political-economic phase changes it engenders; that shift is not the clean process of copying or substitution but instead the messy palimpsests of rearticulation.

Hence, from the contemporary vantage point, Wynter identifies different phases of the development of colonial capitalism as a network of accumulation and the concomitant pieza category that enables exchange: circulation (the African slave), production (the worker), consumption (the consumer). She argues, “This international network . . . leads to . . . a differential ratio of distribution of goods and of rewards, which in turn provides additional legitimacy. The institutionalizing of this ratio results in its lawlike functioning to code differentiated identities.”49 In this sense, the pieza framework lies at the heart of Wynter’s entire theory because it is the figure that engenders the overrepresentation of a single descriptive statement through its fungible capacity to exchange multiplicity within an economy of the One: the assignment of a pieza category as the condition of a certain political economic structure and its attendant distribution of material and discursive value autoinstitutes a specific ontopolitical description of the human. This connective power of the pieza and the palimpsestic overlap between multiple positions has a dual effect that renders it both the site of a given descriptive statement’s regeneration and the possible demonic ground from which to conjugate alternative intergenerational imaginaries.

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#### Aff fails. Bricolage lacks the concrete alternative needed to produce a better alternative future.

Andrew **HOM** School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh **’18** “Silent Order: the Temporal Turn in Critical International Relations” *Millennium* 46(3) p. 324-330

The Rapture of Rupture

Uninhabitable, defined by its other, conflating novel with better, and unavoidably positional – in spite of these tensions rupture enjoys a prominent place in the critical discourse of time. How, then, does it actually work in that discourse? What explains its theoretical punch? I think the answer is a deeply embedded liberal-idealism. To be clear, this is not the neoliberalism of late modernity or the Kantian triad of democracy, interdependence, and multilateralism.182 Rather, rupture recalls the classic liberal commitment to the value and rights of the individual and the consequent responsibilities of sovereign states.183 Nor is it idealist in an ideational or strictly philosophical sense. Rather, I refer to a tendency to abstract ethical aspirations into theoretical assumptions while ignoring the concrete realities of political power, indeterminacy, and unintended consequences.184 Without substantive content, these notions appear relevant to most situations but offer little practical traction because all the heavy lifting is done by assumptions, abstractions, or productive silences. In the case of critical IR, we might think of this liberal-idealism as the rapture of rupture.

First, the liberalism embedded in rupture. Critical scholars declare a commitment only to the ‘politics … [of] an active process of drawing and experimenting with lines, without having any preestablished lines – of history, society, and the world – to fall back on’.185 This springs from their fear of ‘reinforcing practices of security and violent forms of response’.186 But why should we eschew security practices and violence – two august aspects of politics – unless we build on some preestablished lines authorising the importance of human individuals and viewing the state as a threat rather than a security provider and/or realisation of collective will? Other critical scholars draw these lines from the ‘politically affirmative and progressive nature of deconstructive thought, as revealed through its onto-political character’,187 which acknowledges a commitment to choosing a which among many possible whats. This sort of progressivism wordlessly underwrites claims that in ruptures wake, ‘the only guiding principle is that of multiplicity itself’, which prioritises ‘difference’ and ‘singularity’ but presumably not different violence or singular evil.188 Moreover, it gives proposals to experiment with ‘more productive and creative’ approaches the gloss of self-sufficiency by orienting us toward welcome possibilities rather than novel forms of depredation. In these ways, times of rupture depend on classically liberal sensibilities, where the intrinsic value of human individuals makes it important to speak for the powerless, the marginalised, the non-elite and the ‘professionals of nothing’.189 This is entirely consistent with the earlier point that every temporality reflects particular purposes and works according to specific standards of reference. Critical scholars acknowledge this partway, noting that experimentation ‘can be said to express a particular ethics of the event, an ethics of trying to encounter the ambiguities and uncertainties of the pure event in a more productive and creative way’.190 Yet as an ethics, this involves some aspect of reconstruction, just as any critique implies or begs a substantive vision of an alternate future.191

However, such liberal and ethical impulses create tensions in times of rupture. As one liberal theorist notes, liberalism makes little sense ‘as an arena for the unfettered expression of “difference”’; its distinctiveness ‘lies not in the absence but, rather, in the content of its public purposes’ and how they privilege individuals and diversity.192 This is not multiplicity and possibility as such but rather from ‘a view of the human good that favours certain ways of life and tilts against others’.193 Without that ‘tilt’, experimenting with times of rupture becomes ‘a circular exercise, repeated for itself but with no effect, no life force, and no bite beyond the choir to whom it preaches’.194 Or worse, it opens room for novel forms of harm.

This is where idealism becomes crucial to ruptured times. As various champions insist, rupture concerns only an engagement with possibility, thinking about what another politics might require to open up genuine alternatives. Even though other political agents are busy ‘recompos[ing] and reassert[ing]’ interpretive frameworks in rupture’s wake,195 critical advocates are unwilling to ‘subordinate the mysteries of time to specific notions of historical change’.196 Like other engagements with, say, protest cultures, there is a palpable ‘optimism for change’ here; one ‘rooted squarely in [the] refusal to describe what form a newly imagined politics might take’ and thus ‘defined only by its unconventionality’. 197 Novelty and possibility as such only resonate as preferable if we assume they encourage spontaneous improvement by virtue of their ‘extra-discursive’ or ‘natural state, a kind of protean fecundity that exists in idealised form in isolation from politics as it is usually lived’.198 Moreover, this frames violence and subordination as intrinsically old and positive pluralism as resolutely new. Ironically, then, given critical scholars’ resistance to imagined ‘temporal borders’ and avowed interest in ‘a radical critique of the contingent “ground(ing)”’ of modernity,199 the value of rupture depends upon a thoroughly modern form of temporal delineation.

These silent assumptions and hidden logics help ‘characterize’ and thus ‘control’ times of rupture,200 transforming it from a description of traumatic and unlivable conditions to the foundation of a novel ethics that insists we ‘remain with uncertainty’ and ‘hope that something different’ will emerge.201 They are what take us from difference itself to a future ‘deemed worthy of being aspired towards’.202 They thus obscure the need to make alternatives tangible, which is vital for critique’s sake and for the everyday politics of individuals who do not enjoy the privilege of remaining in sheer contingency and indeterminacy.203 And they inhibit any evaluation of ruptured time as a ‘practical question’ of what it actually ‘does’, its ‘effects’, and how it works.204

To drive this point home, recall an earlier vision of novelty and difference tinged by tragedy. Hannah Arendt embraced ‘natality’ as moments of pure possibility but insisted these be tempered by a political sensitivity to potentially catastrophic unintended consequences. Each birth, in her formulation, is ‘uniquely new’ but includes no guarantees – ‘authentic’ novelty might be ‘all-destructive’.205 Ignoring these implications depoliticises and gentrifies novelty and leaves us poorly prepared to resist depredation when it (re-) emerges.206 Only by ignoring or sublimating the heavy lifting can critical scholars pass over a ‘rainbow bridge’207 of sorts that turns the start of the political problem – radical change – into the self-sufficient conclusion of ‘another politics’**,** which occludes the need to reduce contingency while avoiding catastrophe. So while deeply suspicious of promises to ‘take us from here to there’ or move us from past through present toward a better future,208 the critical discourse of rupture works – like the rapture itself – on the assumption ‘of being carried onward or swept along’ by ‘forces of movement’ that emerge independent of conscious effort.209 The rapture of rupture thus marks a missed opportunity, beginning with a legitimately ‘different perspective on time and politics’210 but producing a concept with ‘little relevance to life’211 because it demurs at precisely the point when it becomes necessary to lean on the scales, to encourage this time (or these times) instead of that and thereby privilege some purposes and politics over others. Ruptures are golden opportunities to develop another, better or less awful politics – as such they require more than hope, nebulous experimentation,212 or the refusal to say any more than ‘what I think it does for me’.213 Unless we think novel harms impossible and better outcomes naturally assured, ruptures mark a moment when it is vital to wilfully construct or at least reflexively delimit political time anew.214

#### We should engage in prefigurative design – it is a necessary heuristic for building power that teaches deliberative skills to counter violence

Asad 19 – (Mariam, Sculpting reality from our dreams: Prefigurative design for civic engagement, [School of Literature, Media, and Communication Theses and Dissertations](https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/6068) 2019-07-26)// gcd

In this chapter, I return to my research questions in light of findings and outcomes from my fieldwork, literature review, and deployment of digital systems. I then return to prefigurative design to describe it in greater detail, building on the empirical work described in previous chapters and offering a series of prompts for researchers to put prefigurative design into practice. Prefigurative design is the major contribution of this dissertation, and offers an approach to design research that explicitly seeks to challenge systemic and structural injustice through more collaborative research with radical communities. Prefigurative design is not meant to be a totalizing framework, nor is it meant to be applicable for all research projects and contexts. Instead, it is a model to guide scholarly work to more explicitly support collective efforts around anti-oppression and liberation. It aims to build more just counter-structures to replace harmful institutions complicit in violence, oppression, and exploitation. Prefigurative design is meant to add to and enrich other modes of design research by recommitting to the wellbeing of our community partners and explicitly aligning itself with values of anti-oppression, liberation, and justice (drawing specifically from transformative justice, discussed below in 8.2.2). As such, it anchors research practices in community autonomy, solidarity, and minimizing harm, encouraging researchers to be more critical of their roles as complicit in larger harmful structures and to orient their work towards antioppression. Prefigurative design is grounded in anarchist principles and politics, which offers more generative modes of inquiry to challenge assumptions that may hinder our research practices and design work. Specifically, I offer prefigurative design to HCI researchers interested in supporting the justice work of their community partners and who are interested in broader understandings of digitally-mediated civic and political work to more explicitly address structures of oppression and violence. Next, I return to my research questions as outlined in 1.2 and revisit them in light of the empirical research presented in previous chapters to introduce a more in-depth discussion of prefigurative design as a framework and its anticipated contributions. 8.1 Research Questions 8.1.1 R1. How are democratic ideals embodied by existing forms of civic engagement? I return to the democratic theory introduced in Chapter 2 in light of my work with the cycling advocacy community to identify how democratic ideals are meant to be enacted through existing, more status quo forms of civic engagement. Many civic processes rely on deliberation that follows Rawlsian understandings of democratic governance, specifically relying on informed and engaged citizens to participate in decision-making processes. These deliberations are assumed to rely on reason and evidence to lead to the best outcome for the common good. My fieldwork looked into these deliberative processes in the context of transit planning, where advocates put forth reasoned arguments to argue for increased bike infrastructure. Participatory design research pointed to the tensions of relying on status quo forms of civic engagement, where participants described opportunities for digital tools to both exacerbate and ameliorate existing, legacy issues, such as access, inequity, and improved service delivery. 8.1.2 R2. What are alternate forms of civic engagement that emerge from similar democratic ideals? Next, my work with OOHA pointed to more radical forms of civic engagement as alternate modes of democratic governance, like solidarity, mutual aid, and counterstructures (e.g. underrepresented resident narratives as counter-structures to highlight institutional failure). These practices revealed the boundaries of traditional civic engagement practices: where banks and courts could not keep residents in their homes, OOHA members and their communities offered resources and solidarity to emotionally support residents, offer stability through traumatic displacement and disruption, and organize to try and resist evictions. The use of ICTs through these practices also revealed the limitations of digital systems, which OOHA members subverted and coopted to support their more antagonistic activist work. As discussed in chapter 2, radical democratic mechanisms like solidarity and mutual aid rely on the accumulation of resources to support mutual needs; similarly, OOHA activists accumulated digital and non-digital resources to support their housing justice work independent of support from formal or legislative institutions. The organization itself served as a counter-structure to more status quo forms of governance (e.g. advocates relying on elected officials) and this work was an opportunity to begin experimenting with solidarity practices through research and design interventions. 8.1.3 R3. What is the role of prefiguration in design research? After my work with OOHA, I shifted my research to be less exploratory and be more of an intentional deployment to explore the role of prefiguration in design research. My work on the playbook project was a way to synthesize key principles of prefiguration and enact them through design and research practices. Key to prefiguration—and thus prefigurative design—is the anarchist commitment to anti-oppression and collective liberation via material contributions. That is, prefigurative design does not engage with these values merely as a research interest or a theoretical framework, so the playbook design process was a way to identify spaces for anti-oppressive research. One way our research team enacted this through the playbook process was to revisit the traditional relationship between researcher and participant by holding ourselves more accountable to participant needs and concerns as expressed through our collective work. This fostered a culture of co-ownership and cooperation where community partners were more active agents through design, rather than being subjected to design by researchers. The playbook process was valuable to experiment how to prefigure more equitable relationships with research collaborators. Prefigurative design leverages design processes and practices, first to generate and imagine what more liberatory practices and relationships could look like within the constraints and context of the organization. Through the playbook, we used design activities to explore more equitable and accountable modes of city/resident interactions, particularly in the context of planning and development. The design activities generated best principles, which were the basis of the designed artifact; in this way, the playbook itself was a mode of prefiguration as it set alternate terms of civic interactions and made transparent the expectations and commitments of all involved civic actors (e.g. residents, elected officials). Throughout the playbook process, researchers and participants experimented with more just modes of mutual aid and cooperation, such as more compassionate conflict (and conflict resolution), more transparent and accountable communication, more equitable organizational processes, etc. Beyond our affiliations with neighborhoods and institutions, researchers and residents also had individual agendas, resources, and expertise. The interactions from our design workshops was also a way to prefigure the strategic alignment of existing resources to build counter-structures. The playbook process was valuable for considering prefigurative counter-structures across scale: from the micro- level, residents brought histories and experiences to build a shared vision of better citymaking and engagement. The artifact itself was a way to scale this vision up, making transparent and accessible resources and capacities within each organization or community to build cumulatively towards larger, more impactful, and more radically progressive change on the scale of a large American city. Through my cumulative fieldsites and observations, this body of work suggests that there are many different kinds of prefiguration that can be facilitated through design interventions: in the Cycle Atlanta project, participants described technical features that could be incorporated into digital systems, rendering the artifact the vehicle for prefiguration. In this way, artifacts can store forms of knowledge and underrepresented narratives through which a community can be more autonomous and begin to create counter-structures that diverge from institutions that don’t serve their needs or address their concerns. Through OOHA, the group’s work was aimed at prefiguring different organizational structures to be more robust and sustainable in the face of unpredictable change and turbulence. Supported by digital tools, the group tried to imbue redundancy and flexibility in their digital tools and technology practices to better weather the hostile circumstances of their political work. The playbook was valuable as a kind of testing ground for prefiguration where the artifact contained documentation to prefigure alternative modes of governance. Here, the playbook was not the vehicle for prefiguration itself, but instead disseminated the expectations and modes of participation in order to prefigure public processes, decision-making, and interactions with elected officials. Finally, PAD was an attempt to incorporate multiple kinds of prefiguration simultaneously: through organizational structures and social relations, digital artifacts, and organizational processes and capacities. 8.1.4 R4. What are the limits and opportunities of prefiguration in design research? Prefigurative design relies on certain conditions and circumstances to exist that may facilitate more just modes of research production and collaboration. As such, there are limitations if those conditions are not ideal: for example, with PAD, there was a strong hierarchical organizational structure that was a formidable barrier to enacting certain kinds of change within the organization. Additionally, this structure enforced ensured the group was committed to institutional obligations, which further challenged the possibility for internal progressive change. Here, a significant limitation of prefiguration in design research is if there are not preexisting structures or networks to support that work: the playbook project was successful because there was a team of researchers working with participants who had bought into our collaborative work. However, prefigurative design is not likely to have meaningful impact for research projects undertaken by a single researcher, or with more skeptical or resistant participants. Additionally, as Western institutions swing more to the ‘right’ of the political spectrum, these more harmful institutions will likely require more coordinated and robust collectives to resist them. This is not to say that counter-institutions are not possible in these conditions, but to highlight the additional support and resilience needed to survive. My work with PAD, despite its many challenges, also pointed to a rich opportunity that prefiguration brings to research, which is a focus on minimizing and repairing harm. Through their emphasis on dignity and autonomy, the PAD approach to social work was an important model for how to approach my own work in HCI and design. Contrary to more traditional user-centered approaches, which focus solely on local concerns and needs, the staff’s radical care work connected local concerns (e.g. the individual challenges of program participants) to more structural institutions and patterns. This showed me the role that smaller-scale prefiguration can have on larger scale issues: many community-based research projects encounter challenges that are shared across different issues and contexts (i.e. different forms of oppression) and addressing these common concerns through local sites is a way to explore more restorative approaches to these concerns as they exist beyond these settings. Prefigurative design thus became an approach to challenging oppression both on local and larger scales. Contribution: Prefigurative Design 8.2.1 Prefigurative design As mentioned in Chapter 3, prefigurative design borrows heavily from prefigurative politics, which is strongly motivated by collective anti-oppression work and is operationalized through counter-institutions. Prefigurative design is a way to imagine a more just, liberatory alternative future, to adjust current practices to better align with that vision, and then– incrementally, with much iteration, and adjustments– to build towards that alternative future by bringing it into the present. Prefigurative design manifests as three kinds of work: envisioning, acting presently, and building counter-institutions. These three practices are oriented around the vision and practices of a community partner, and thus requires negotiation and realignment throughout the research process, both within the researcher themselves, but also with the community, as much as resources and constraints will allow. Next, I will describe each kind of prefigurative design work in more detail, describing how they emerged from the empirical work presented in previous chapters.

#### Democracy is an unfinished project – institutional battles are valuable, and defeatist attitudes ensure the world remains as it is.

Glaude 16 (Eddie S., Jr., Professor of African American Studies and Religion @Princeton and a PhD in Religion @Princeton, *Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves*, p. 185-197, Print)

CHANGE HOW WE VIEW GOVERNMENT

For more than three decades, we have been bludgeoned with an idea of government that has little to no concern for the public good. Big government is bad, we are told. It is inefficient, and its bloated bureaucracies are prone to corruption. Even Democrats, especially since Bill Clinton, have taken up this view. For example, Obama says, "We don't need big government; we need smart government."

For some on the right, big government is bad because it aims to distribute wealth to those who are lazy and undeserving. "Big government" is just a shorthand for dreaded entitlement programs-all too often coded language for race. In this view, "big government" is the primary agent of enforcing racial equality, taking hard-earned stuff from white Americans and giving it to undeserving others. Government cannot do such a thing, they argue, without infringing on the rights of white Americans. And even government-mandated redistribution will not solve the problem. As Barry Goldwater put the point in 1964, "No matter how we try, we cannot pass a law that will make you like me or me like you. The key to racial and religious tolerance lies not in laws alone but, ultimately, in the hearts of men." From this perspective, government plays no role in changing our racial habits. Why would we want to make it bigger?

But Goldwater failed to realize that governmental indifference can harden hearts, and government action can create conditions that soften them. **People's attitudes aren't static or untouchable**. They are molded by the quality of interactions with others, and **one of the great powers of government involves shaping those interactions-not determining them in any concrete sense, but defining the parameters within which people come to know each other and live together**. Today, for example, most Americans don't believe women should be confined to the home raising children, or subjected to crude advances and sexist remarks by men. The women's-rights movement put pressure on the government, which in turn passed laws that helped change some of our beliefs about women. Similarly, the relative progress of the 1960s did not happen merely by using the blunt instruments of the law. **Change emerged from the ways those laws, with grassroots pressure, created new patterns of interactions, and ultimately new habits**. Neither Obama's election to the presidency nor my appointment as a Princeton professor would have happened were it not for these new patterns and habits.

None of this happens overnight. It takes time and increasing vigilance to protect and secure change. I was talking with a dose friend and he mentioned a basic fact: that we were only fifteen years removed from the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when Ronald Reagan was elected president and Republicans began to dismantle the gains of the black freedom struggle. Civil rights legislation and the policies of the Great Society had just started to reshape our interactions when they started to be rolled back. We barely had a chance to imagine America anew-to pursue what full employment might look like, to let the abolition of the death penalty settle in, to question seriously the morality of putting people in prison cells, and to enact policies that would undo what the 1968 Kerner Commission described as "two Americas"­ before the attack on "big government" or, more precisely, the attack on racial equality was launched. The objective was to shrink the size of government ("to starve the beast") and to limit its domestic responsibilities to ensuring economic efficiency and national defense. Democrats eventually buckled, and this is the view of government, no matter who is in office, that we have today. It has become a kind of touchstone of faith among most Americans that government is wasteful and should be limited in its role-that it shouldn't intrude on our lives. Politicians aren't the only ones who hold this view. Many Americans do, too. **Now we can't even imagine serious talk of things like full employment or the abolition of prisons**.

**We have to change our view of government, especially when it comes to racial matters**. Government policy ensured the vote for African Americans and dismantled legal segregation. Policy established a social safety net for the poor and elderly; it put in place the conditions for the growth of our cities. **All of this didn't happen simply because of individual will** or thanks to some abstract idea of America. **It was tied up with our demands and expectations**. Goldwater was wrong. So was Reagan. And, in many ways, so is Obama. Our racial habits are shaped by the kind of society in which we live, and our government plays a big role in shaping that society. As young children, our community offers us a way of seeing the world; it lets us know what is valuable and sacred, and what stands as virtuous behavior and what does not. When Michael Brown's body was left in the street for more than four hours, it sent a dear message about the value of black lives. When everything in our society says that we should be less concerned about black folk, that they are dangerous, that no specific policies can address their misery, we say to our children and to everyone else that these people are "less than"-that they fall outside of our moral concern. We say, without using the word, that they are niggers.

**One way to change that view is to enact policies that suggest otherwise**. Or, to put it another way, to change our view of government, we must change our demands of government. For example, for the past fifty years African American unemployment has been twice that of white unemployment. The 2013 unemployment rate for African Americans stood at 13.1 percent, the highest annual black unemployment rate in more than seventy years. Social scientists do not generally agree on the causes of this trend. Some attribute it to the fact that African Americans are typically the "last hired and first fired." Others point to changes in the nature of the economy; still others point to overt racial discrimination in the labor market. No matter how we account for the numbers, the fact remains that most Americans see double-digit black unemployment as "normal." However, a large-scale, comprehensive jobs agenda with a living wage designed to put Americans, and explicitly African Americans, to work would go a long way toward uprooting the racial habits that inform such a view. It would counter the nonsense that currently stands as a reason for long-term black unemployment in public debate: black folk are lazy and don't want to work.

**If we hold the view that government plays a crucial role in ensuring the public good**-if we believe that all Americans, no matter their race or class, can be vital contributors to our beloved community-**then we reject the idea that some populations are disposable**, that some people can languish in the shadows while the rest of us dance in the light. The question ''Am I my brother's or my sister's keeper?" is not just a question for the individual or a mantra to motivate the private sector. It is a question answered in the social arrangements that aim to secure the goods and values we most cherish as a community. In other words, we need an idea of government that reflects the value of all Americans, not just white Americans or a few people with a lot of money.

We need government seriously committed to racial justice. As a nation, we can never pat ourselves on the back about racial matters. We have too much blood on our hands. Remembering that fact-our inheritance, as Wendell Berry said-does not amount to beating ourselves over the head, or wallowing in guilt, or trading in race cards. Remembering our national sins serves as a check and balance against national hubris. We're reminded of what we are capable of, and our eyes are trained to see that ugliness when it rears its head. But when we disremember-when we forget about the horrors of lynching, lose sight of how African Americans were locked into a dual labor market because of explicit racism, or ignore how we exported our racism around the world-we free ourselves from any sense of accountability. Concern for others and a sense of responsibility for the whole no longer matter. Cruelty and indifference become our calling cards.

We have to isolate those areas in which long-standing trends of racial inequality short-circuit the life chances of African Americans. In addition to a jobs agenda, **we need a comprehensive government response to the problems of public education and mass incarceration**. **And I do mean a government response**. Private interests have overrun both areas, as privatization drives school reform (and the education of our children is lost in the boisterous battles between teachers' unions and private interests) and as big business makes enormous profits from the warehousing of black and brown people in prisons. Let's be clear: private interests or market-based strategies will not solve the problems we face as a country or bring about the kind of society we need. We have to push for massive government investment in early childhood education and in shifting the center of gravity of our society from punishment to restorative justice. We can begin to enact the latter reform by putting an end to the practice of jailing children. Full stop. We didn't jail children in the past. We don't need to now.

In sum, government can help us go a long way toward uprooting racial habits with policies that support jobs with a living wage, which would help wipe out the historic double-digit gap between white and black unemployment; take an expansive approach to early childhood education, which social science research consistently says profoundly affects the life chances of black children; and dismantle the prison-industrial complex. We can no longer believe that disproportionately locking up black men and women constitutes an answer to social ills.

**This view of government cannot be dismissed as a naive pipe dream**, because political considerations relentlessly attack our political imaginations and limit us to the status quo. We are told before we even open our mouths that this particular view won't work or that it will never see the light of day. We've heard enough of that around single payer health care reform and other progressive policies over the Obama years. **Such defeatist attitudes conspire to limit our imaginations and make sure that the world stays as it is**. But those of us who don't give a damn about the rules of the current political game must courageously organize, advocate, and insist on the moral and political significance of a more robust role for government. We have to change the terms of political debate.

Something dramatic has to happen. American democracy has to be remade. John Dewey, the American philosopher, understood this:

The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered and rediscovered, remade and reorganized; while the political and economic and social institutions in which it is embodied have to be remade and reorganized to meet the changes that are going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and new resources for satisfying these needs.

Dewey saw **American democracy as an unfinished project**. He knew that the aims and purposes of this country were not fixed forever in the founding documents, but the particular challenges of our moment required imaginative leaps on behalf of democracy itself. Otherwise, undemocratic forces might prevail; tyranny in the form of the almighty dollar and the relentless pursuit of it might overtake any commitment to the idea of the public good; and bad habits might diminish our moral imaginations.

The remaking of America will not happen inside the Beltway. Too many there have too much invested in the status quo. A more robust idea of government will not emerge from the current political parties. Both are beholden to big money. **Substantive change will have to come from us**. Or, as the great civil rights leader Ella Baker said, "we are the leaders we've been looking for"-a model of leadership that scares the hell out of the Reverena Sharpton. We will have to challenge the status quo in the streets and at the ballot box. In short, it will take a full-blown democratic awakening to enact this revolution.

#### No political will for anarchism.

Milanovic 21 -- visiting presidential professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and an affiliated senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study. (Branko,"Degrowth: solving the impasse by magical thinking ," Substack, <https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/degrowth-solving-the-impasse-by-magical?r=16uxt&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;utm_source=twitter> Jun 27 2021)//gcd

Now degrowers are not irrational people. The reason why they are pushed in this magical corner is because when they try to “do the numbers” they are led to an impasse. They do not want to allow for significant increase in world GDP because it will, even if decoupling (of which they are skeptical) happens, drive energy emissions too high. If one wants to keep world GDP more or less as now one must (A) “freeze” today’s global income distributions so that some 10-15% of the world population continue to live below the absolute poverty line, and one-half of the world population below $PPP 7 dollars per day (which is, by the way, significantly below Western poverty lines). This is however unacceptable to the poor people, to the poor countries, and even to degrowers themselves.

Thus they must try something else: introduce a different distribution (B) where everybody who is above the current mean world income ($PPP 16  per day) is driven down to this mean, and the poor countries and people are,  at least for a while, allowed to continue growing until they too achieve the level of $PPP 16 per day. But the problem with that approach is that one would have to engage in a massive reduction of incomes for all those who make more than $PPP 16 which is practically all of the Western population. Only 14% of the population in Western countries live at the level of income less than the global mean. This is probably the most important statistic that one should keep in mind. Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced. They would have to preside over economic depressions for about a decade, and then let the new real income stay at that level indefinitely. (Even that would not quite solve the problem because in the meantime, many poor countries would have reached the level of $PPP 16 per day and they too would  have to be prevented from growing further.) It is quite obvious that such a proposition is a political suicide. Thus degrowers do not wish to spell it out.

They are  brought to an impasse. They cannot condemn to perpetual poverty people in developing countries who are just seeing the glimpses of a better life, nor can they reasonably argue that incomes of 9 out of 10 Westerners ought to be reduced.

The way out of the impasse is to engage in semi-magical and then outright magical thinking.

Semi-magical thinking (that is, thinking where the objective—however laudable- is not linked with any tools of achieving it) is to argue that GDP is not a correct measure of welfare, or that better outcomes in certain dimensions can be achieved by countries or peoples with a lower GDP (or lower incomes). Both propositions are correct.

GDP does leave out non-commercialized activities that are welfare-enhancing. It is,  like every other measure, imperfect and one-dimensional.  But if it is imperfect at the edges while fairly accurate overall. Richer countries are countries that are generally better-off in almost all metrics, from education, life expectancy, child mortality to women’s employment etc. Not only that: richer people are also on average healthier, better educated, and happier. Income indeed buys you health and happiness. (It does not guarantee that you are a better person; but that’s a different topic.)  The metric of income or GDP is strongly associated with positive outcomes, whether we compare countries to each other, or people (within a country) to each other. This is something so obvious that it is bizarre that one needs to restate it: people migrate from Morocco to France  because France is a richer country and they will be better-off there. American Blacks are worse off than American Whites in all dimensions, not least in terms of their income. This is the background to the Black Lives Matter movement that wants to make Blacks better off and equal in income and health to Whites.

Since this fails, the next approach taken by degrowers consists in pulling out individual cases of countries the have performed exceptionally well on some metrics (like Cuba on health) and those that have performed exceptionally badly (like US on life expectancy) and to argue that a certain desirable outcome can be achieved with much less money. It is indeed true that some countries or some people, despite their lack of income, have achieved excellent things while others have used their income inefficiently or wastefully. But it does not follow from such individual examples that they overturn the regularities described In the previous paragraph. What degrowers do is to first metaphorically run a regression of a desirable outcome on GDP or income, and when they observe that the two are closely correlated, forget about the regression, pull out an outlier, and claim that the outlier shows that the relationship does not exist.

That is clearly wrong too. So the next stage in semi-magical thinking consists in trying to convince people that they are wrongly pursing the Golden Calf of wealth and that much more modest lives would be better, or at least are feasible. To that effect they use baskets of goods and services that allow “modest” standard of living and satisfy all basic needs. But they fail to show us how such “modest needs” are to be implemented: how will people be obliged to consume only so much and not more? In war situations, this is done through rationing. Indeed, one could ration the number of square meters of textile that each household may be able to buy, introduce meat and gasoline coupons and so forth. It has been done many times. But degrowers know that a wartime economy in the peacetime would not be politically acceptable, so they just do the basket calculation, show that it is compatible with “planetary boundaries”, and leave it at that. How we are going to have that basket accepted by people, or implemented despite their will, is not something they desire to be disturbed with.

#### Profit motive prevents anarchism.

Andreoni 20 – (Valeria, "The Trap of Success: A Paradox of Scale for Sharing Economy and Degrowth" Sustainability 12, no. 8: 3153. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083153> 2020)//gcd

From a theoretical perspective, if large similarities exist between sharing economy and degrowth, then extensive discrepancies occur in the way in which these two concepts are applied. As reported above, the sharing economy is a worldwide phenomenon rapidly growing across sectors and activities. Degrowth, on the contrary, has been developed through a model of living and academic debate and, up to now, a limited number of applications have taken place [50]. One of the inhibiting factors can be related to the difficulties in applying an alternative model in a system when the profit-oriented logic drives the main socio-economic dynamics. For this reason, a consistent overview of the possible implications generated by large-scale applications of degrowth is still missing. Given the fact that degrowth ideas could generate effective transformations only when adopted by the largest part of consumers, a specific analysis would be needed to investigate the impacts and feasibility of large-scale applications. Within this context, the main objective of the next sections is to hypothesize and discuss a paradox of scale, potentially able to drive the failure of alternative economic models. Given the fact that, from a theoretical perspective, many similarities exist between sharing economy and degrowth, the next approximate is the sharing economy as a large-scale application of degrowth. In particular, the main contradictions existing between the promises of the sharing economy and degrowth, are compared to the outcomes generated by practices. The discrepancies are then used to discuss the feasibility of large-scale applications of alternative economic models, such as degrowth. Being aware that the approximations used in this paper inevitably lead to simplifications, the objective of this analysis aligns with the idea previously discussed in other publications [50,69,70]. Testing the degrowth hypothesis through modeling and empirical assessments can contribute to develop the debate around sustainable transitions to build the bridge between academic discourse, socio-political initiatives, and business environment. 3.2. Promises versus Outcomes of Practices: Analysis of the Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts Following the approach previously used by other papers [3,30], the main frames used to define the sharing economy are compared, in this section, with the socio-economic and environmental impacts generated by practices. The main objective is to identify existing tensions and to discuss the sustainability challenges of sharing. Starting from the analytical framework reported in Table 2, the main discrepancies existing between promises and practices are reported below. In Table 3, the main elements of discussion are summarized. 3.3. Economic Dimension: Promises versus Impacts of Practices A. Disrupt centralized institutions and large corporations versus creation of oligopolies: According to previous studies [26,28,30,71], the network externalities and economies of scale generated using Internet platforms, has facilitated the development of oligopolies and has reduced the market for small and local enterprises. In line with the examples reported in Table 1, most of the sharing economy’s submarkets tend to be dominated by a small number of companies that earned the dominating status by designing a specific business model or through an early market entry. The large quantity of transactions, needed to compensate the costs of technological investments, has converged the successful platform toward oligopolistic structures, clearly in contrast with the idea of “disrupt centralized institutions and large corporations” included as one of the promises of sharing [72,73]. B. Encourage small and local enterprise versus small-business competition: Instead of promoting small and local enterprises, the sharing economy has resulted in increased competition [74]. The development of sharing accommodation practices, such as Airbnb or Couchsurfing, for example, has provided a substitute for hotel nights in the cheaper segment of the market and has radically changed consumers’ preferences and behavior. According to [75], the users of the sharing economy (generally looking for cheaper solutions, local authenticity, and more unique experiences) have shifted the demand from the traditional hotel industry toward the sharing hospitality. Therefore, the market share of the small and family-run accommodations has been reduced. In addition, the possibility to supply accommodation without the need to be compliant with the regulations affecting the hospitality sector (such as fire, health and safety standards, and taxation) represents an element of unfair competition affecting the small businesses operating in the market. The lower costs associated with a lack of standards and regulations, has contributed to drive a reduction in the average hospitality price. According to data provided by [76], the increased competition among small accommodation providers has generated 8–10% revenue loss in the hotel sector in Austin, Texas. In a similar way, the estimation provided by [77] calculated that the 416,000 guests staying in Airbnb in July 2013 has generated around one million lost room nights for city hotels in New York. On the contrary, large corporations, offering hospitality solutions for business travelers, medium-high income consumers, and package holidays do not seem to be significantly affected [76,77]. C. Empowering individuals by promoting flexible employment opportunities and additional sources of income versus working-related uncertainties: The sharing economy has framed itself as a provider of flexible employment opportunities, where traditional employment contracts are substituted by short-term and freelance work [78]. The main implications of this working structure, however, seem to benefit businesses more than workers. Classifying workers as independent contractors, allow businesses to reduce the costs and to remove the legal liability for accidents arising at work. The lack of pension and insurance, together with income instability and insecurities is, on the contrary, one of the main downsides affecting the workers involved in the sharing economy’s markets [79,80]. In addition, the rapid expansion of this underregulated and underpaid working logic, is also affecting the traditional working markets. When an increasing number of agents get involved in the logic of less security and more flexibility, the overall working conditions can decline [81–83]. As reported by De Stefano [81] (p. 6), “extreme flexibility, shifting of risks to workers and income instability have long become a reality for a portion of the workforce in current labor markets that goes far beyond the persons employed in the gig-economy.” It can indeed be argued that working on collaborative platforms is part of a much vaster trend toward the casualization of labor [84,85]. D. Promote cheaper and easiest access to goods and services and provide opportunities for income redistribution, revenue, and savings versus prices increase, income disparities, and tax avoidance: As reported above, the easiest and cheapest access to goods and services has been described as an opportunity to increase consumption possibilities, particularly for the lowest-income categories. When considering the supply side of the sharing practices, however, the sharing economy can contribute to amplifying the income disparities existing in society [86]. As reported by [87], for example, the additional revenue generated by sharing accommodation benefits people with a middle or upper-income level. That is because, the lower-income categories, characterized by a limited availability of goods to share, are typically excluded from the supply side of the market. Sharing accommodation, has also been criticized for the negative impacts generated on the price of the long-term renting accommodation. The increase in profitability of short-term renting has driven a reduction of long-term renting supply, with consequent impacts for the lower-income categories living in rented accommodation. According to data provided by [88], the average renting price in New York has increased by 11% between 2005 and 2012, with an average income rise of just 2%. The redistributive factors of the sharing activities have also been largely criticized in relation to taxation. According to data provided by [89], the sharing economy was estimated to be worth about $15 billion in 2015 with the potential to grow to £$335 billion in 2025. The amount of tax collected, however, is limited and controversial. Airbnb, for example, is financially located in Ireland, where the money made from transactions taking place all over the world are collected. The lack of clear accountability and the related difficulties to track income, make tax avoidance an element of unfair market competition and a major social issue. The unclear international regulation and the difficulties in public surveillance, creates a clear opportunity for fiscal avoidance, with consequent implications for social disparities and redistribution [28,72]. In addition, as reported by [10], the fact that platforms do not give governments the access to transactions and user data does not facilitate the enforcement of regulations and the design of clear and consistent taxation systems. The creation of institutional boundaries, such as the cap in the number of nights offered in sharing accommodation is, for example, difficult to apply without a clear track of users and suppliers. A. Increase social bonding and collaboration versus social drivers’ reduction: As reported above, the sharing economy has often been described as a tool to generate a new form of collaborations, solidarity, and social bonding [34,90–93]. Researches have, however, highlighted that most of the sharing economy users have no desire to increase community bonds or to share communal links with other members [29]. The ability of platforms to create social connections seems also to have decreased over scale and time. According to studies published by [94,95], when a market expands, economic reasons prevail, and interpersonal connections became more casual and less durable. In a similar way, an analysis investigating the main car sharing motivations highlight that opportunistic and self-interest behaviors play a much more significant role than socio-environmental motivations [79]. Price convenience, savings, and accessibility seem to be the main factors driving most of the consumers’ choices toward sharing economy options [96–98]. B. Increase conviviality and community trust versus discrimination: Instead of increasing social equality and community trust, the sharing economy seems to be characterized by some degree of exclusionary and discriminatory behaviors [40]. Based on studies published [99–102], prejudicial discriminations in ratings and reviews have been found for Afro-American guests and Afro-American Airbnb owners and Uber drivers have reported to be discriminated in terms of longer average waiting times and more frequent cancellations. C. Networking increases versus reduction of face-to-face interactions: When the market expands and more profit-oriented actors enter in the sharing economy’s businesses, the social contacts and face-to-face interactions seem to reduce. The increasing use of online quality ratings, for example, contributes to the declining importance of personal relationships. In addition, the introduction of technological innovations, such as the smart locks on sharing accommodation, provides users with a digital service of check-in and key handover that allow for a complete avoidance of social interactions [10]. According to [103], 75% of Airbnb’s overall revenue come from rentals where the owners do not share the space with users. The initial idea of social connections, interactions, and trust have been taken over by activities operating with a small degree of social and face-to-face interactions. D. Promote the use of participative online resources such as open access, open sources, and collaborative platform versus income, cultural, and aging constraints: The development of information and communication technologies has been considered as an opportunity to facilitate the use of participative online resources and to democratize the access to information. However, the difficulties that a relevant percentage of the world population are experiencing in catching-up with technological development is de facto an element of exclusion for a large amount of people with income, cultural, and ageing constraints [104]. When applied to the context of the sharing activities, this general downside of information and communication technologies, can then exclude a specific group of people from participating in sharing exchanges. According to [75], for example 53% of the users are under 40 years old and across all the sharing economy industries the usage seems to decrease with an increasing age. 3.5. Environmental Dimension: Promises versus Impacts of Practices A. Reduce consumption versus consumption increase: As highlighted by [105], a relative cost reduction can increase the overall market demand. In the sharing economy, different elements can contribute to generate a “rebound effect” detrimental for resources: • The development of the sharing economy platforms and the creation of new markets expand the volume of commerce and inject additional purchasing power into the economy. In addition, the development of “on demand” economy (e.g., Uber), where the consumer creates new capacity by arranging a service that would not have been made in the first place, is in contrast with the idea of reducing the overall level of demand. The reduction of prices generated by (i) increasing competition, (ii) reduced dependency on ownership, and (iii)reduction of searching costs, can contribute to the rise of consumption [10, 40,106]. • The easiest and cheapest access to goods and services can stimulate unsustainable and indulgent consumption [107,108]. The cost reduction and the accessible increase related to car sharing practices, for example, can generate additional journeys and reduce the public transport demand. The possibility to cover a part of the travelling cost, offered for example by Blablacar and Kangaride, can change the individual decision on the travelling mode and, as reported above, increase the demand for less sustainable practices [4,109]. • The large amount of information made available by the use of the Internet, provides an extensive source of evidence about past usage patterns and consumers’ preferences. The online companies, with an easy access to consumer’s information, can use targeted advertising and tailored promotions to increase sales and market share. In addition, a tension also exists in relation to the fact that city cycle schemes are usually financed through advertising of large and multinational corporations, as Santander in London or Coca-Cola in Belfast. B. Reduction of energy and material demand versus increased use of energy and resources: A lack of clear data investigating the environmental impacts of the sharing practices make it difficult to analyze the transition toward a more sustainable economy. At the present, no clear evidence exists around the reduction of energy and material demand [10]. On the contrary, a study published by [110] shows that the ecological footprint of e-business is greater than conventional shopping. C. Promote reuse and responsible consumption versus lack of care: The short-term social relationships characterizing most of the sharing economy activities and the fact that consumers are paying for a temporary service, generally lead to a lack of caring attitude and reduce the incentives to treat products gently [4]. In line with the idea of moral hazard and information asymmetries, involved with shared resources [111], the deterioration rate of goods can be higher than in the case of a private ownership. In addition, recent studies suggest that users’ environmental motivations are often less important than the economic ones [112,113]. 4. Discussion: Paradox of Scale and Future Research Directions Based on the analysis reported above, the main findings of this paper can be summarized by the fact that the recent developments of the sharing practices seem to be in contrast with the theoretical frameworks used to define the socio-economic and environmental characteristics of sharing. When the scale expands, a profit-oriented logic seems to prevail and the idea of a more sustainable and socially connected economic system fails to be delivered. In particular, the profit opportunities are attracting an increasing number of for-profit businesses that use the socio-environmental and egalitarian statements as a way to increase the market share. In addition, the use of information and communication technologies, the related reduction of interpersonal connections, and the exclusion of people unable to catch up with technological development, impose constraints on social interactions and participation. As a result, the impacts and goals of the sharing economy seem to converge toward those of the traditional economic practices, where profit opportunities prevail on socio-environmental motivations. As previously highlighted by other authors [26,28], the theoretical pathway to equity and sustainability has been successfully reframed as a new form of neoliberal capitalism. Within this context, the findings of this paper highlight the risk of a paradox of scale, where the sharing economy fails to deliver as a consequence of success. If from one side, the more sustainable behaviors can generate effective changes only when applied by the majority of actors, on the other side, large-scale applications and expansion risk converging toward the traditional economic practices. This sort of trap is also highlighted by the recent path taken by the development of some local currencies. Initially organized as a way to sustain local business and promote a more responsible consumption, some of the local currencies have today expanded to include franchising and corporation activities. An example is provided by Colu, the Liverpool Local Pound, where franchising accounts for more than 10% of the businesses listed in the website. In addition, the percentage discount offered to consumers that purchase products by using the local currency is a stimulus for consumption increase, clearly in contrast with the idea of responsible consumption and sustainability. The use of virtual coins and the necessity to have mobile phones and internet connection also represent a factor of exclusion for the oldest and the less wealthy categories of society that in contrast would be those that could benefit the most from the development of a local and fairer economy.

#### Aff causes backlash, fails to resolve environmental challenges, and causes chaos – cap solves.

Karlsson 21 – (Rasmus, "Learning in the Anthropocene" Soc. Sci. 10, no. 6: 233. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10060233> 18 June 2021)// gcd

Unpacking this argument, it is perhaps useful to first recognize that, stable as the Holocene may have seemed from a human perspective, life was always vulnerable to a number of cosmic risks, such as bolide collisions, risks that only advanced technologies can mitigate. Similarly, the Black Death of the 14th century should serve as a powerful reminder of the extreme vulnerability of pre-industrial societies at a microbiological level. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think of the Holocene as providing a relatively stable baseline against which the ecological effects of technological interventions could hypothetically be evaluated. With most human activities being distinctively local, nature would for the most part “bounce back” (even if the deforestation of the Mediterranean basin during the Roman period is an example of that not always being the case) while larger geophysical processes, such as the carbon cycle, remained entirely beyond human intentional control. Even if there has been some debate about what influence human activities had on the preindustrial climate (Ruddiman 2007), anthropogenic forcing was in any case both marginal and gradual. All this changed with the onset of the Great Acceleration by which humans came to overwhelm the great forces of nature, causing untold damage to fragile ecosystems and habitats everywhere, forever altering the trajectory of life on the planet (Steffen et al. 2011b). In a grander perspective, humanity may one day become an interplanetary species and thus instrumental in safeguarding the long-term existence of biological life, but for the moment, its impact is ethically dubious at best as the glaciers melt, the oceans fill up with plastics, and vast number of species are driven to extinction. Faced with these grim realities, it is of course not surprising that the first impulse is to seek to restore some kind primordial harmony and restrain human activities. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that, even if their aggregate impact may have been within the pattern of Holocene variability, pre-modern Western agricultural societies were hardly “sustainable” in any meaningful sense. Experiencing permanent scarcity, violent conflict was endemic (Gat 2013), and as much as some contemporary academics like to attribute all evils to “capitalism” (Malm 2016), pre-capitalist societies exhibited no shortage of religious intolerance and other forms of social domination. It is thus not surprising that some have argued the need to reverse the civilizational arc further yet and return to a preliterate hunter-gather existence (Zerzan 2008) even if this, obviously, has very little to do with existing political realities and social formations. Under Holocene conditions, the short-term human tragedy may have been the same, but it did not undermine the long-term ability of the planet to support life. In a world of eight billion people, already accumulated emissions in the atmosphere have committed the planet to significant warming under the coming centuries, with an increasing probability that committed warming already exceeds the 1.5-degree target of the Paris Agreement even if all fossil-fuel emissions were to stop today (Mauritsen and Pincus 2017). This means that sustained negative emissions, presumably in combination with SRM, will most likely be needed just to stabilize global temperatures, not to mentioning countering the flow of future emissions. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), assuming that all the pledges submitted under the Paris Agreement are fulfilled, limiting warming to 1.5 degrees will still require negative emissions in the range of 100—1000 gigatons of CO2 (Hilaire et al. 2019, p. 190). The removal of carbon dioxide at gigaton scales from the atmosphere will presumably require the existence of an advanced industrial society since low-tech options, such as afforestation, will be of limited use (Gundersen et al. 2021; Seddon et al. 2020), especially in a future of competing land-uses. It is against this backdrop of worsening climate harms that the limits of “precaution”, at least as conventionally understood, become apparent. While degrowth advocates tend to insist that behavioral change, even explicitly betting on a “social miracle” (Kallis 2019, p. 195), is always preferable to any technological risk-taking (Heikkurinen 2018), that overlooks both the scope of the sustainability challenge and the lack of public consent to any sufficiently radical political project (Buch-Hansen 2018). While there may be growing willingness to pay for, say, an electric vehicle (Hulshof and Mulder 2020), giving up private automobile use altogether is obviously a different animal, to say nothing about a more fundamental rematerialization of the economy (Hausknost 2020). Again, the problem is one in which change either (a) remains marginal yet ecologically insufficient or (b) becomes sufficiently radical yet provokes a strong political counterreaction. A similar dynamic can be expected to play out at the international level where countries that remain committed to growth would quickly gain a military advantage. To make matters worse, there is also a temporal element to this dynamic since any regime of frugality and localism would have to be policed indefinitely in order to prevent new unsustainable patterns of development from re-emerging later on. All this begs the obvious question, if the political and economic enforcement of the planetary boundaries are fraught with such political and social difficulties, would it not be better to instead try to transcend them through technological innovation? Surprisingly, any high-energy future would most likely be subject to many of the same motivational and psychological constraints that hinder a low-energy future. While history shows that existing nuclear technologies could in theory displace all fossil fuels and meet the most stringent climate targets (Qvist and Brook 2015), it seems extremely unlikely, to put it mildly, that thousands of new reactors will be built over the course of the coming decades in response to climate change. Outside the world of abstract computer modelling, real world psychological and cultural inertia tends to ensure that political decision-making, at least for the most part, gravitates to what is considered “reasonable” and “common sense”—such as medium emissions electricity grids in which wind and solar are backed by biomass and gas—rather than what any utilitarian optimization scenario may suggest. Even if the global benefits of climate stabilization would be immense, the standards by which local nuclear risks are assessed, as clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident which led to a worldwide retreat from nuclear energy despite only causing one confirmed death (which, though obviously regrettable, has to be put in relation to the hundred and thousands of people dying every year from the use of fossil fuels), underscores the uneven distribution of perceived local risks versus global benefits and the associated problem of socio-political learning across spatial scales. Almost two decades ago, Ingolfur Blühdorn identified “simulative eco-politics” as a key strategy by which liberal democracies reconcile an ever-heightened rhetoric of environmental crisis with their simultaneous defense of the core principles of consumer capitalism (Blühdorn 2007). Since then, declarations that we only have “ten years to save the planet” have proliferated, and so have seemingly bold investments in renewable energy, most recently in the form of US President Joseph Biden’s USD 2.25 trillion climate and infrastructure plan. Still, without a meaningful commitment to either radical innovation or effective degrowth, it is difficult to see how the deployment of yet more wind turbines or the building of new highways will in any way be qualitatively different from what Blühdorn pertinently described as sustaining “what is known to be unsustainable” (Blühdorn 2007, p. 253). However, all is not lost in lieu of more authentic forms of eco-politics. Independent of political interventions, accelerating technological change, in particular with regard to computing and intelligent machine labor, may one day make large-scale precision manipulation of the physical world possible in ways that may solve many problems that today seem intractable (Dorr 2016). Similarly, breakthroughs in synthetic biology may hold the key to environmentally benign biofuels and carbon utilization technologies. Yet, all such progress remains hypothetical and uncertain for now. Given what is at stake, there is an obvious danger in submitting to naïve technological optimism. What is less commonly recognized is that naïve optimism with regard to the prospects of behavioral change may be equally dangerous. While late-capitalist affluence has enabled many postmaterial identities and behaviors, such as bicycling, hobby farming, and other forms of emancipatory self-expression, a collapsing economy could quickly lead to a reversal back to survivalist values, traditional hierarchical forms of domination, and violence (Quilley 2011, p. 77). As such, it is far from obvious what actions would actually take the world as a whole closer to long-term sustainability. If sustainability could be achieved by a relatively modest reduction in consumption rates or behavioral changes, such as a ban on all leisure flights, then there would be a strong moral case for embracing degrowth. Yet, recognizing how farreaching measures in terms of population control and consumption restrictions that would be needed, the case quickly becomes more ambiguous. While traditional environmentalism may suggest that retreating from the global economy and adopting a low-tech lifestyle would increase resilience (Alexander and Yacoumis 2018), it may do very much the opposite by further fragmenting global efforts and slowing the pace of technological innovation. Without an orderly and functioning world trade system, local resources scarcities would be exacerbated, as seen most recently with the different disruptions to vaccine supply chains. In essence, given the lack of a stable Holocene baseline to revert to, it becomes more difficult to distinguish proactionary “risk-taking” from “precaution”, especially as many ecosystems have already been damaged beyond natural recovery. In this context, it is noteworthy that many of the technologies that can be expected to be most crucial for managing a period of prolonged overshoot (such as next-generation nuclear, engineering biology, large-scale carbon capture and SRM) are also ones that traditional environmentalism is most strongly opposed to. 3. Finding Indicators From the vantage point of the far-future, at least the kind depicted in the fictional universe of Star Trek, human evolution is a fairly straightforward affair along an Enlightenment trajectory by which ever greater instrumental capacity is matched by similar leaps in psychological maturity and expanding circles of moral concern. With the risk of sounding Panglossian, one may argue that the waning of interstate war in general and the fact that there has not been any major nuclear exchange in particular, does vindicate such an optimistic reading of history. While there will always be ups and downs, as long as the most disastrous outcomes are avoided, there will still be room for learning and gradual political accommodation. Taking such a longer view, it would nevertheless be strange if development was simply linear, that former oppressors would just accept moral responsibility or that calls for gender or racial justice would not lead to self-reinforcing cycles of conservative backlash and increasingly polarizing claims. Still, over the last couple of centuries, there is little doubt that human civilization has advanced significantly, both technologically and ethically (Pinker 2011), at least from a liberal and secular perspective. However, unless one subscribes to teleology, there is nothing inexorable with this development and, it may be that the ecological, social, and political obstacles are simply too great to ever allow for the creation of a Wellsian borderless world (Pedersen 2015) that would allow everyone to live a life free from material want and political domination. On the other hand, much environmental discourse tends to rush ahead in the opposite direction and treat the c limate crisis as ultimate evidence of humanity’s fallen nature when the counter-factual case, that it would be possible for a technological civilization to emerge without at some point endangering its biophysical foundations, would presumably be much less plausible. From an astrobiological perspective, it is easy to imagine how the atmospheric chemistry of a different planet would be more volatile and thus more vulnerable to the effects of industrial processes (Haqq-Misra and Baum 2009), leaving a shorter time window for mitigation. Nick Bostrom has explored this possibility of greater climate sensitivity further in his “vulnerable world hypothesis” (Bostrom 2019) and it begs to reason that mitigation efforts would be more focused in such a world. However, since climate response times are longer and sensitivity less pronounced, climate mitigation policies have become mired in culture and media politics (Newman et al. 2018) but also a statist logic (Karlsson 2018) by which it has become more important for states to focus on their own marginal emission reductions in the present rather than asking what technologies would be needed to stabilize the climate in a future where all people can live a modern life.

# 2NC

**Refusing responsibility for collective creation of the world produces genocide and speciescide. Only a humanist vocabulary can produce the collective action required by the Anthropocene.**

Donna **HARAWAY** Distinguished American Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness Department and Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz **’16** *Staying with the trouble: making kin in the Chthulucene* p. 35-38

It matters what thoughts think thoughts. It matters what knowledges know knowledges. It matters what relations relate relations. It matters what worlds world worlds. It matters what stories tell stories. Paintings by Baila Goldenthal are eloquent testimony to this mattering.17 What is it to surrender the capacity to think? These times called the Anthropocene are times of multispecies, including **human, urgency**: of great mass death and extinction; of onrushing disasters, whose unpredictable specificities are foolishly taken as unknowability itself; of refusing to know and to cultivate the capacity of response-ability; of refusing to be present in and to onrushing catastrophe in time; of unprecedented **looking away**. Surely, to say “unprecedented” in view of the realities of the last centuries is to say something almost unimaginable. How can we think in times of urgencies without the self-indulgent and self-fulfilling myths of apocalypse, when every fiber of our being is interlaced, even complicit, in the webs of processes that must somehow be engaged and repatterned? Recursively, whether we asked for it or not, the pattern is in our hands. The answer to the trust of the held-out hand: think we must.

Instructed by Valerie Hartouni, I turn to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann’s inability to think. In that surrender of thinking lay the “banality of evil” of the particular sort that could make the disaster of the Anthropocene, with its **ramped-up genocides** and **speciescides**, come true.18 This outcome is still at stake; think we must; we must think! In Hartouni’s reading, Arendt insisted that thought was profoundly different from what we might call disciplinary knowledge or science rooted in evidence, or the sorting of truth and belief or fact and opinion or good and bad. Thinking, in Arendt’s sense, is not a process for evaluating information and argument, for being right or wrong, for judging oneself or others to be in truth or error. All of that is important, but not what Arendt had to say about the evil of thoughtlessness that I want to bring into the question of the geohistorical conjuncture being called the Anthropocene.

Arendt witnessed in Eichmann not an incomprehensible monster, but something much more terrifying—she saw commonplace thoughtlessness. That is, here was a human being unable to make present to himself what was absent, what was not himself, what the world in its sheer notone- selfness is and what claims-to-be inhere in not-oneself. Here was someone who could not be a wayfarer, could not entangle, could not track the lines of living and dying, could not cultivate response-ability, could not make present to itself what it is doing, could not live in consequences or with consequence, could not compost. Function mattered, duty mattered, but the world did not matter for Eichmann. The world does not matter in ordinary thoughtlessness. The hollowed-out spaces are all filled with assessing information, determining friends and enemies, and doing busy jobs; negativity, the hollowing out of such positivity, is missed, an astonishing abandonment of thinking.19 This quality was not an emotional lack, a lack of compassion, although surely that was true of Eichmann, but a deeper surrender to what I would call immateriality, inconsequentiality, or, in Arendt’s and also my idiom, thoughtlessness. Eichmann was astralized right out of the muddle of thinking into the practice of business as usual no matter what. There was no way the world could become for Eichmann and his heirs—us?—a “matter of care.”20 The result was active participation in genocide.

#### A vision for a different order is vital. No political vision comes ready-made with the agent capable of enacting it. Decolonization and the New International Economic Order demonstrate the world-making capacity for re-ordering an egalitarian and domination-free world.

Adom **GETACHEW** Poli Sci @ Chicago **’19** *Worldmaking after Empire* p. 180-181

Owing to these political crises and the shifting coordinates of international politics, which were only magnified with the fall of the Soviet Union, the language of self-determination and the institutional form of the state appeared to no longer animate political visions within the postcolonial world. Self-determination as worldmaking and nation-building and the postcolonial state imagined as the agent of international and domestic transformation were central to building a world after empire. As the conditions that had made these commitments viable dissipated, their political purchase also declined. Emblematic of this emptying of the promise of self-determination was Michael Manley’s return to the position of prime minister.12 Having lost his 1980 reelection as Jamaica still reeled from the consequences of the debt crisis and structural adjustment, Manley assumed the office again in 1989. Converted to the neoliberalism he had resisted in the late 1970s, the erstwhile democratic socialist now insisted, “If you want a really dynamic, effective economy, the only damn thing you can do is to pursue the market logic completely. . . . That means you have to divest what was brought under state control . . . and [expose] the economy to the shock of competition, knowing full well that some of what has been built up will be lost in order to create a leaner but more enduring process of development.”13

While Manley himself maintained that he was rethinking and not abandoning democratic socialism, the about-face was undeniable and exemplified the political closure that characterized the fall of self-determination. In a revealing correspondence with Kari Polanyi Levitt, a member of the New World Group at the University of West Indies, Manley reflected on the tragedy this closure entailed.14 At the height of his despair, he concluded that the NIEO was “predicated on a fantasy—namely that anyone in international politics will respond to an argument built on ethics.”15 When Levitt reminded him, “The NIEO agenda was not based on ‘ethics’ but on the sovereign rights of developing countries over natural resources, on the need for codes of conduct for transnationals, and international measures to stabilize commodity prices,” Manley changed his tune.16 In response, he argued that the “failure to unite OPEC and other developing countries,” which he called the “real tragedy,” and the rise of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who “buried” the Third World’s demands for equality, had led to the collapse of the NIEO.17 But if this second assessment captured the contingent political conditions that contributed to the NIEO’s displacement, it did not give Manley any hope that anticolonial worldmaking might be resuscitated.

Like the Manley of the 1990s, we live in the shadow of self-determination’s fall. The vision of a postimperial world order that gave rise to three decades of anticolonial worldmaking appears far removed from our political present. Looking back from our vantage point and with a clear view of the forces arrayed against this project, the fall of self-determination might appear inevitable. We might even believe, as Manley briefly did, that those projects were fantastical and unrealistic. But to come to this set of conclusions is to evade reckoning with the ways that we inhabit as our present the promises and ruins of anticolonial worldmaking. The incomplete decolonization that culminated in a world of unequal nation-states, the regional organizations that emerged from the dream of federation, and the visions of global justice that stand in the place of the NIEO’s welfare world indicate the scale of both expectations and disappointments that characterized anticolonial worldmaking. Examining this present, it would be a mistake to collapse the partiality and eventual decline of a set of languages and strategies for making a world after empire with the demise of the moral and political vision that looked forward to an egalitarian and domination-free world.

Emerging from the imperial integration and differentiation that has structured the modern world, this vision of an anti-imperial world had different articulations before the rise of self-determination and might yet be remade in new languages and modes. Part of the task of this book has been to show that even instances that appeared as moments of closure—first the decline of interwar internationalisms and the consolidation of a system of nation-states, and later the political and economic limits of the postcolonial state—were occasion for reformulating the contours of an anti-imperial future and enacting new strategies to realize this vision. On this view, the fall of self-determination marks not only a dead end but also a staging ground for reimaging that future. In the Black Atlantic world, from which the worldmakers of this book emerged, intimations of a new language are afoot in the Movement for Black Lives, the Caribbean demand for reparations for slavery and genocide, and South African calls for a social and economic decolonization. Like the worldmakers of decolonization, these political formations have returned to the task of rethinking our imperial past and present in the service of imagining an anti-imperial future.

#### Criticisms of Westphalia don’t apply – sovereign equality should be considered an achievement of decolonization, not an imposition of Western statehood.

Adom **GETACHEW** Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Political Science and the College @ Chicago **’19** “The limits of sovereignty as responsibility” *Constellations* 26 (2) p. 7-8

Although it is associated with the UN Charter and is often described as Westphalian, this model of sovereignty, particularly the claim that all sovereign states have equal legal standing, is best understood as the achievement of decolonization. In the rapid expansion of the state system following World War II, anticolonial nationalists challenged the hierarchical and exclusionary international order that went hand in hand with colonialism by claiming equal membership of all states in the then newly constituted UN. Thus, sovereign equality emerged as a “counter-concept of empire” (Cohen, 2012, p. 200). By insisting on the formal equality of states, anti-imperialists fashioned a universal society of states that was characterized by legal and political pluralism and set strict limitations on the exercise of foreign inteference (Bain, 2003, p. 163; Cohen, 2012, 200).

The redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility marks a departure from this model of sovereignty. Recasting sovereignty as merely “instrumental” rather than “intrinsic” or universal has permitted an account of external sovereignty that depends on the state having efficaciously exercised its function of protection (Slaughter, 2005, p. 628; Tesón, 2003, p. 93). According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, because sovereignty accrues to the state as a means of providing security, “sovereignty misused, in the sense of failure to fulfill this responsibility, could become sovereignty denied” (Slaughter, 2005, p. 628). For Slaughter, the innovation of the responsibility to protect was to override what were considered rights of sovereignty, especially the right to non-intervention from external powers, by making the external attributes of sovereignty conditional on it its domestic exercise. This conditional form of sovereignty, Robert Keohane argues, requires an international order that permits gradations of sovereignty and abandons “the classic ideal-type of Westphalian sovereignty even as an aspiration” (Keohane, 2003, p. 279).

At first glance, the ICISS report and other UN documents resist the conclusion that sovereignty is rendered conditional when it is defined as responsibility. Instead, they argue with Lafont and others that the responsibility to protect strengthens rather than weakens sovereignty (ICISS, 2001, p. 35). According to the 2009 Secretary General Report, “responsibility to protect is a friend of sovereignty not an adversary” (UN General Assembly, 2009a, p. 51). Yet taken to its logical conclusion, the idea that sovereign responsibility unfulfilled gives grounds for denying sovereignty entails a hierarchical world where the sovereignty of largely postcolonial and weak states can be curtailed or denied. Rather than an international order predicated on the formal equality of states, this vision of conditional sovereignty sanctions sovereign inequality. It marks an abandonment of the “strictly egalitarian world order that emerged out of decolonization” (Bain, 2003, p. 164).

If sovereign equality was meant to protect and preserve legal and political pluralism in the international system, the revival of conditional sovereignty marks a turn away from such pluralism (Simpson, 2004, p. 67). Proponents of the responsibility to protect have explicitly defended this anti-pluralism. Slaughter, for instance, argues, “Liberal theory permits more general distinctions among different categories of states based on domestic regime type” (Slaughter, 1995, p. 509). Moreover, according to Fernando Tesón, a “liberal conception of state legitimacy” should be the international standard and its violation could trigger intervention (Tesón, 2003, p. 99). In this endorsement of forms of legalized hierarchy, Slaughter and Tesón echo the broad developments in international relations and international law in the last three decades. The conditional dimensions of sovereignty as responsibility are akin to the arguments in favor of quasi-sovereignty and neo-trusteeship that have resurfaced since the end of the ColdWar. Arguments of this kind are often explicitly connected to a critique of the universalization of sovereignty established during decolonization and they harken back to 19th and early 20th-century arguments that mobilized the standard of civilization or the ideal of trusteeship to argue for the unequal status of nations in international society.6

Importantly, however, the conditional sovereignty of the responsibility to protect is a much more limited standard concerned with the four crimes. The responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity is viewed as the “minimum content of good international citizenship” (ICISS, 2001, p. 8). But, as I have argued, despite its minimalism, the paternalist, instrumental and conditional characteristics of sovereignty as responsibility constitute a normative diminution of sovereignty that have significant political implications. Shorn of its earlier attachment to claims of popular sovereignty and equal membership in international society, sovereignty as responsibility reproduces and legitimizes an international order where the sovereignty of some is conditional, non-state actors and international organizations can perform sovereign functions, and a democratic politics of human rights is displaced by efficacy, administration, and expertise. What we have in the responsibility to protect then is less the reconciliation of sovereignty and human rights but a drastically reshaped definition of sovereignty and a limited view of human rights as humanitarian governmentality. When viewed from this perspective, the pitfalls of the Libyan intervention are not ones of mission creep, or instances of the misapplication of a principle. Instead, they are entailments of the diminution of the norm of sovereignty that in turn contribute to an international order in which legal hierarchy is once again permitted.

#### 3. Non-domination flips responsibility and accountability against powerful states – the alternative proves the international community has a responsibility to secure the background conditions that end neo-colonialism and indirect hierarchy.

Adom **GETACHEW** Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Political Science and the College @ Chicago **’19** “The limits of sovereignty as responsibility” *Constellations* 26 (2) p. 11-13

I use the republican term non-domination to characterize this anticolonial account of sovereignty because it retains and extends the republican tradition's insight that the domestic capacity to exercise self-government depends on overcoming external domination (Skinner, 1998, pp. 49–50, 2010, pp. 100–101). From the republican perspective, “no matter how free a people is on the inside—no matter how far individual citizens control their states—a people can only be free insofar as an outside condition is satisfied too” (Pettit, 2016, p. 61). In the age of decolonization, this outside condition of international non-domination was envisioned as both requiring an external sovereignty that functioned as a defensive shield and an alternative picture where sovereignty offered only limited protections and would have to be reconfigured through regional and international institutions. Elsewhere I detail why this second strategy failed and how its failure prompted nationalists to embrace more thoroughly the model of sovereign non-domination as a shield to defend against external encroachment (Getachew, 2019, forthcoming). But while this second model was unrealized in the age of decolonization, like the domestic linking of popular sovereignty and human rights, here too the anticolonial account of sovereignty as international non-domination offers critical resources in our contemporary efforts to rethink sovereignty.

First, we might productively contrast the relationship between external and internal sovereignty embedded in the ideal of non-domination with that offered in the responsibility to protect principle. As I noted in the previous section, the responsibility to protect conceives of external sovereignty as conditional on the internal exercise of protection. In order words, a state's claim to sovereignty in the international sphere depends on its willingness and capacity to fulfill its responsibilities to those it governs and to the international community. The account of international nondomination asks us to consider the flipside of this conditional mode of sovereignty by illuminating the ways that the internal exercise of self-government requires a context of international non-domination, which includes international institutions that can mitigate, undo, and circumvent the entrenched substantive hierarchies of the international order. On this view, the hierarchical features of the international order, which range from the outsized power of the Security Council to the structural inequality of international trade, the protections provided to private corporations and the unfair conditions attached to loans and foreign aid, impinge on and directly shape the character of domestic politics. An engagement with the entanglements of domestic and international politics reframes what we take to be internal failures or crises of sovereignty by illuminating how conditions of international domination may enable and exacerbate domestic domination (Orford, 2003).

Second, and relatedly, examining the failures of democratic self-government and the humanitarian crises these failures have engendered through a perspective that begins with the entanglements of domestic and international politics refigures what responsibility in the international context might mean. Proponents of the responsibility to protect have celebrated the ways that the principle locates the state as the bearer of primary responsibility. Though viewed as setting a limit on intervention and expanding the scope of international assistance, it also saddles states— often weak states—with the burden of responsibility for political, economic, and humanitarian crises that are not fully of their own making. If the interactions between and intersections of domestic and international politics contribute in important ways to the crises that are often viewed as internal to states, this account of responsibility obscures the ways in which the international community is always implicated and should be understood as already responsible. To speak, then, of international responsibility as a backup responsibility when the state fails to protect human rights divorces state failure from the constitutive backdrop of the inequitable international distribution of power.

The idea of sovereignty as a shield, which I noted was part of the anticolonial account of international nondomination, might play a similar role of obscuring the central role of international hierarchy in the domestic crises to which the responsibility to protect is a response. According to Lafont, “insisting upon the nominal sovereignty of states” releases external actors “from taking responsibility for the role that their actions might play in bringing about some of the ‘extraordinary injustices occurring within state boundaries’” (Lafont, 2016, p. 433). Moreover, as Jennifer Pitts notes, the view that we inhabit a world of formal sovereignty only recognizes encroachments on independence and equality in the exceptional cases of military intervention and obscures the routine and persistent ways in which international hierarchy undermines self-government. The view that our world consists of autonomous states is “dangerously misleading today in its failure to convey the depth of states’ mutual influence and dependence in a globalized economy and a thick, variegated, and asymmetrical international legal order” (Pitts, 2013, p. 148–149).

Sovereignty as non-domination, however, points beyond this conundrum in two respects. First, it should be clear that sovereignty's role as a shield has never been a fully realized feature of the international order and was at best an aspiration. The formal rights of sovereignty are not a “pre-existing political ‘fact’ of absolute and impermeable state power,” but instead an anti-imperial demand from peripheral and colonized states for equal membership that was only partially secured (Cohen, 2012, p. 201). The persistence of forms of legalized inequality after decolonization illustrates the ways in which sovereignty's formal protection remains elusive for most states (Anghie, 2005, p. 239–244; Grovogui, 1996). Second, from the anticolonial perspective, even if the formal barriers against intervention could be fully realized, the question of substantive political and economic hierarchies requires thinking non-domination beyond sovereignty as a shield. As the example of Nkrumah's project of pan-African federation suggests, achieving non-domination can also entail the disaggregation of sovereignty and the creation of robust regional and international institutions that not only guard against direct forms of external encroachment, but can also meaningfully reconfigure relations of hierarchy.

Together, the international and domestic dimensions of an anticolonial account of sovereignty offer theoretical avenues out of the normative diminution of sovereignty entailed in the responsibility to protect. As I have argued above, the responsibility to protect renders sovereignty instrumental, paternalist, and conditional. This normative diminution of sovereignty entails an international order that permits legalized hierarchy, which constituted the institutional backdrop of the Libya intervention. While proponents of the responsibility to protect have sought to introduce procedural checks and reinterpret the principle in ways that distance it from its invocation in military intervention, I have argued that the institutional and practical entailments of sovereignty's normative erosion cannot be easily contained. The twin emphasis of anticolonial sovereignty recovered here—that individual rights need to be nested in collective self-government and that the practice of collective self-government in turn requires international institutions that realize non-domination—points toward a politicized account of human rights and suggests that the international order is deeply implicated in and responsible for the domestic domination and humanitarian crises associated with internal state failure. This does not provide a straightforward answer to the question of what we ought to do in instances of humanitarian crises that demand an international response. But the aim here is to make the case that envisioning a world where such crises are prevented and human rights are secured requires asking additional questions about the ways that the inequalities of the international order fuel domestic domination. International responsibility from this perspective cannot be limited to interceding when a state manifestly fails, but instead requires undoing the hierarchical economic and political relations that continue to structure our international order.

5 BEYOND POST-WESTPHALIA

Beyond offering alternatives to what I have called the normative diminution of sovereignty as responsibility, recovering this anticolonial account of sovereignty illustrates the importance of centering the historical legacies and more recent configurations of empire in our efforts to rethink sovereignty. We have come to understand our contemporary international order as a post-Westphalian order. This designation indicates the ways that economic globalization has undermined the nation-states’ capacity to steer a national economy meaningfully. Moreover, the rise of international institutions and human rights law since 1945 have set normative limits and constraints on the exercise of sovereignty. In this account, the transition and transformation from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian order operates as both a historical and conceptual marker. Historically the regime of Westphalian sovereignty is said to have come into being with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the rise of the European state system, which was progressively expanded beyond Europe in a process that culminates with decolonization in the 20th century (Benhabib, 2007; Cohen, 2012, p. 80; Habermas, 1998; Held, 2002). From a conceptual point of view, Westphalia stands for a regime of sovereignty where autonomy, equality, and non-intervention are prioritized and privileged.

The historical and conceptual accounts sit uneasily with each other insofar as the conceptual understanding of Westphalian sovereignty does not map on to the historical period with which it is associated. Indeed, the ideal of a world of sovereign and equal states was belatedly attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia during the mid-20th century (Schmidt, 2011). Moreover, the international order has only ever approximated the conceptual model during the 20th century age of decolonization that universalized inclusion in the UN. But even in the UN system, legal inequality has always been an institutionalized feature of the international order (Simpson, 2004). The persistence of not only a substantive but also a legal hierarchy in the international sphere suggests that the conceptual model of Westphalian sovereignty has never been part of the practices of international society. As a result, invocations of the emergence of a post-Westphalian world order are often accompanied by an acknowledgment that a world of autonomous equal states, now in decline, is more a conceptual foil rather than any reflection of lived reality.7

However, continuing to pose our present predicament as post-Westphalian even as we acknowledge that a Westphalian world order never existed invites an exaggeration of contemporary transformations. This binary elides the persistence of international hierarchy, obscures the ways that contemporary curtailments of sovereignty harken back to the long history of imperialism, and delinks the contemporary experience of economic globalization from the imperial economic networks that preceded it and make it possible. In short, theWestphalian/post-Westphalian distinction elides the way that empire was and continues to be constitutive of our international order.

If it is the case that Westphalian sovereignty not only no longer exists, but also never did, we might give up a picture in which an international order, guided by the principles of autonomy, equality and non-intervention has come to a sudden andwell-earned demise. Doing so would open conceptual and critical space to wrestlewith the recurring features of sovereign inequality and international hierarchy. Such an engagement with the past and present of an imperial world order suggests that our efforts to rethink sovereignty cannot be limited to overcoming the conceptual trappings of a Westphalian model of sovereignty but also require outlining the contours of a post-imperial international order. It is here that an engagement with the project of decolonization will prove instructive. While we cannot return to and reproduce the political projects of anticolonial nationalists, their attunement to the multiple modes of international hierarchy and their ambitious efforts to secure an egalitarian international order, which ranged from projects of regional federation to the New International Economic Order, provide critical and normative resources to think with and think against.

#### Blackness and citizenship both possible to re-signify. Haitian sovereignty re-articulated blackness as a political category dedicated to the end of slavery.

Adom **GETACHEW** Poli Sci @ Chicago **’16** “Universalism After the Post-colonial Turn: Interpreting the Haitian Revolution” *Political Theory* 44 (6) p. 835-837

Racial hierarchy was also the target in Article 14 of the constitution, which abolished “all distinctions of color” and declared “Haitians shall be known from now on by the generic denomination of blacks.”76 Prior to its independence, Haiti was governed by a taxonomy of race that identified more than a hundred categories of racial difference, which organized free and enslaved people of color hierarchically. By abolishing this hierarchy, the constitution hoped to overcome the racial distinctions that had facilitated colonial slavery. Moreover, by elevating blackness into the general category to which all Haitians belonged, the racial category once located at the bottom of the colonial hierarchy was resignified**.**77 It would be freed from its historical association with slavery and celebrated as the marker of citizenshi**p**.

In highlighting the effort to institutionalize individual and collective autonomy, I have called attention to precisely those elements of Haitian independence in 1804 that Buck-Morss finds to be anti-universal. The prohibitions against white property owners and the renaming of all citizens as black appear to be exclusionary, while the appeal to Empire suggests a mimicry of the imperial ambitions that characterized European states of the time. There are reasons to doubt this reading, however. Take for instance the exclusion of white property owners in Article 12 of the 1805 constitution. In the subsequent article, naturalized white women who were married to Haitians, as well as Germans, Poles, and their descendants are exempted from the prohibition on property ownership.78 The redescription of all Haitians as black requires rethinking in light of this exemption. It cannot be read as an exclusionary measure that reduced citizenship to a nativist or racialist entitlement. Blackness was reconceived as a political category that signaled “historical or potential resistance” to slavery and colonial domination.79 It was the contributions of Germans and Poles to the revolutionary war that allowed them to become Haitian citizens and therefore black.

This redefinition of blackness also made it possible to extend Haitian citizenship beyond its territorial confines. Revolutionary leaders acknowledged that ending slavery and creating the first black nation-state were not local events but would have reverberations throughout the Atlantic world. Even before independence and as the transatlantic slave trade continued, Toussaint planned to set free all Africans who landed in Haiti. Moreover, he outlined plans to sail to Africa in an effort to end the slave trade and extend freedom and French nationality to millions.80 Like Toussaint, Dessalines projected the universalism of the Haitian Revolution. Linking his victory over France in Haiti to the salvation of the entire Western Hemisphere, he proclaimed, “I have saved my country; I have avenged America.”81 He indicated that this link would be realized by spreading the revolution against slavery and colonial rule throughout the Atlantic world.82

While Toussaint’s and Dessalines’s early aims of exporting the revolution through military expansion were not feasible, their successors sought to make Haiti a refuge for slaves and colonial subjects throughout the Americas. As Ada Ferrer notes, in the 1810s, Haitian vessels stopped slave ships, freeing the slaves and providing them rights of residency in Haiti.83 Moreover, Sybille Fischer documents how the 1816 constitution of the southern republic constitutionally guaranteed the right of asylum to “all Africans and Indians, and those of their blood” and promised naturalization after a year of residency.84 This constitutional clause established Haiti as “a free soil” territory where slaves and colonial subjects from across the region could be free and gain citizenship. 85 With the reunification of the north and south in 1820, this asylum provision was extended to the entire country and led to an increase in the number of fugitive slaves requesting asylum.86

These provisions of asylum suggested that while the claim “all Haitians are black” could not be reversed to read “all blacks are Haitians,” the Haitian state opened up the possibility for all blacks in the region to become Haitian.87 Unlike the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which made an abstract claim that “all men are born free and equal in rights,” the early Haitian constitutions tied freedom to the territory of Haiti where slavery was concretely abolished. The asylum clause made this concrete freedom accessible to those that lived beyond its borders. The “territory without slavery [was] now expressly and legally available to outsiders, to slaves of foreign masters, subjects of foreign kings, and outcasts of other governments.”88 Of those who took advantage of asylum in Haiti were about six to thirteen thousand African Americans. Haitian citizenship was thus transnational and promised autonomy to those who were denied even the smallest modicum of liberty and independence throughout the Americas.89

The asylum provision not only made possible transnational citizenship but also afforded Haiti a way of expanding its anti-slavery and anti-colonial project beyond its territorial confines. Simón Bolívar and his generals were twice granted exile during their efforts to liberate Venezuela. Moreover, Alexandre Pétion, the president of the southern republic, provided ammunitions and soldiers to Bolívar on two conditions: that he emancipate all slaves in liberated territories and that all captive Africans taken from slave ships be turned over to Haiti where they would qualify for citizenship.90 These conditions allowed Pétion to continue the project of avenging America by spreading emancipation and independence beyond Haiti’s territorial boundaries and securing citizenship for the formerly enslaved who were denied membership elsewhere.

## 1NR

#### Anticompetitive practices are horizontal or single firm conduct

FTC ‘ND [Federal Trade Commission; “Anticompetitive Practices”; https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices; AS]

Anticompetitive Practices

The FTC takes action to stop and prevent unfair business practices that are likely to reduce competition and lead to higher prices, reduced quality or levels of service, or less innovation. Anticompetitive practices include activities like price fixing, group boycotts, and exclusionary exclusive dealing contracts or trade association rules, and are generally grouped into two types:

agreements between competitors, also referred to as horizontal conduct

monopolization, also referred to as single firm conduct

The FTC generally pursues anticompetitive conduct as violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”

Horizontal Conduct

It is illegal for businesses to act together in ways that can limit competition, lead to higher prices, or hinder other businesses from entering the market. The FTC challenges unreasonable horizontal restraints of trade. Such agreements may be considered unreasonable when competitors interact to such a degree that they are no longer acting independently, or when collaborating gives competitors the ability to wield market power together. Certain acts are considered so harmful to competition that they are almost always illegal. These include arrangements to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids.

For more information, check out Dealings with Competitors.

Single Firm Conduct

It is unlawful for a company to monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade, meaning a firm with market power cannot act to maintain or acquire a dominant position by excluding competitors or preventing new entry. It is important to note that it is not illegal for a company to have a monopoly, to charge “high prices,” or to try to achieve a monopoly position by aggressive methods. A company violates the law only if it tries to maintain or acquire a monopoly through unreasonable methods.

#### Here are examples – aff changes none of them.

Gibbs ‘ND [Gibbs Law Group; “Anticompetitive Practices”; https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/unlawful-practices/; AS]

Federal and state antitrust laws prohibit anticompetitive behavior and unfair business practices that harm other businesses and consumers.

Examples of these unlawful, anticompetitive practices include:

Price Fixing – an agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or services are sold.

Pay-for-Delay – an agreement between a brand drug manufacturer and a would-be generic competitor to delay the release of a generic version of the branded drug, depriving consumers of lower-priced generics.

Bid-Rigging – competitors agree in advance who will submit the winning bid during a competitive bidding process. As with price fixing, it is not necessary that all bidders participate in the conspiracy.

Monopolization – one or more persons or companies totally dominates an economic market.

Unfair Competition – an attempt to gain unfair competitive advantage through false, fraudulent, or unethical commercial conduct.

Market Division – an agreement between competitors not to compete within each other’s geographic territories.

Group Boycotts – two or more competitors agree not to do business with a specific person or company.

Exclusive Dealing Arrangements – an agreement that a buyer will only buy exclusively from the supplier.

Price Discrimination – charging different prices to similarly situated buyers. Certain types of price discrimination may be illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act.

Tying – when a company makes the purchase of an item conditioned on buying a second item.